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Although cyberspace and the atmosphere are distinct arenas,
they share similarproblems of overuse, difficulties of enforcement, and
challenges of collective inaction and free riders. With weather patterns
changing, global sea levels rising, and temperatures set to exceed 1.5
degrees Celsius by 2100, climate change is a problem that affects the
entire world. Yet its benefits are dispersed, and its harms are often
concentrated. Similarly, much of the cost of cyber attacks is focused in
a few nations even as others are becoming havens for cybercriminals.
Yet it is also true that actions taken by a multiplicity of actors on a
small scale can impact both the global climate change problem and the
cause of promoting a global culture of cybersecurity. This Article
tracks the evolution of the climate change regime, focusing both on the
top-down UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and bottomup bilateraland regional efforts, and then compares and contrasts this
history with Internet governance.
The potential of polycentric
governance to mitigate the twin global collective action problems of
climate change and cyber attacks is assessed as policymakers
increasingly head toward a polycentric future.
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ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CYBER ATTACKS

I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to think of two issues with a greater potential to
negatively impact both our natural environment and the global
economy than climate change and cyber attacks.
Though the
long-term estimates on both threats are notoriously hard to pin down,
already-contested estimates on the cost of cyber attacks range from
approximately $400 billion in 2014 to more than $3 trillion by 2020 (a
figure larger than estimates for the global illegal drugs market).1
Similarly, the cost of climate change has been estimated at some
$1.2 trillion annually, which if accurate is roughly 1.6 percent of
global gross domestic product (GDP). 2 The price tag of delaying action
to stem climate change has been estimated at more than 3 percent of
global GDP-which would come to more than $150 billion annually in
the United States alone-while the least-developed nations face losing
more than 10 percent of their GDP.3 Looking ahead, the White House
has noted that "net mitigation costs increase, on average, by
approximately 40 percent for each decade of delay."' 4 In other words,
there is an urgent, global need to mitigate the risk of both cyber
insecurity and a changing climate. The question is how-and, more
broadly, whether-twentieth-century multilateral solutions used to
address other global collective action problems still resonate in the
5
twenty-first century.
The Internet has become a prolific tool for economic
development and free expression, disproving early assertions such as

1.
See, e.g., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE
GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME 2 (2014), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-

impact-cybercrime2.pdf [https://perma.ccHA7T-Q4JW]; Brian Taylor, Cyberattacks Fallout
Could Cost the Global Economy $3 Trillion by 2020, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 20, 2014, 10:38 AM),
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyberattacks-fallout-could-cost-the-global-economy-3-trillionby-2020/ [https://perma.cc/5VY3-Z7MG].
2.
See Climate Change Is Already Damaging Global Economy, Report Finds, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/sep/26/climatechange -damaging-global-economy [https://perma.ccfBV9Y-K3RT].
3.

See id.; EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE COST OF DELAYING ACTION TO STEM

CLIMATE
CHANGE
2
(2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
the cost of delaying-action to stem climate change.pdf [https://perma.cc/89HP-5VL3].
4.

Id.

5.
Collective action problems are a classic social dilemma in that people tend to
maximize their short-term personal interests ahead of the collective good. This is a problem, in
economic terms, because an outcome exists that would make everyone better off if only people
cooperated. See Elinor Ostrom, A PolycentricApproach for Coping with Climate Change 6 (World
Bank
Group,
Policy
Research
Working
Paper
No.
5095,
2009),
http:/www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/pe/2009/O4268.pdf [https:/perma.cc/J7M8-7K5Z] (explaining
that there is "at least one outcome [that] yields higher returns for all who are involved, but
participants posited as maximizing short-term benefits make independent decisions and are not
predicated to achieve this outcome").
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those by Professor Paul Krugman that the Internet's impact would
barely rival the fax machine. 6 Indeed, according to the consultancy
McKinsey & Company, more than $8 trillion is processed annually
through e-commerce alone. 7 Current estimates also suggest that
cyberspace contributes some $1.6 trillion to the global economy, a
figure larger than the GDP of Canada.8 Estimates on the economic
benefit of a healthy, stable global ecosystem are even more
complicated to calculate, but those that have tried, such as the World
Bank, have placed the figure in the trillions. 9
Thus, much is to be gained by ascertaining effective
interventions to promote both sustainable development and
sustainable cybersecurity. 10
Indeed, the potential for a crosspollination of best practices between these regimes beckons. Although
the atmosphere and cyberspace are distinct extraterritorial arenas,
they share similar problems of overuse, difficulties of enforcement,
and the associated challenges of collective inaction and free riders.1 1
Moreover, billions of "actors affect the global atmosphere," 12 just as
they do the Internet.1 3 With weather patterns shifting, global sea
levels rising, and temperatures set to exceed 1.5 degrees Celsius by
2100, climate change is a problem affecting the entire world, but it is a
problem with dispersed economic benefits and often-concentrated
environmental harms. 14 Similarly, the cost of cyber attacks is
6.
See Jay Yarow, Paul Krugman Responds To All the People Throwing Around His
Old Internet Quote, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 30, 2013, 9:06 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/paulkrugman-responds-to-internet- quote- 2013 -12 [https://perma.cc/L5BC-C5BC].
7
See JAMES MANYIKA & CHARLES ROXBURGH, McKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE GREAT
TRANSFORMER: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 1 (2011),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high-tech-telecoms-internet/the-great-transformer
[https://perma.cc/R9RP-V4FU].
8.
See id at 1-2.
9.
See, e.g., New Study Adds Up the Benefits of Climate-Smart Development in Lives,
Jobs,
and
GDP,
WORLD
BANK
GROUP
[WBG]
(June
23,
2014),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/06/23/study-adds-up-benefits-climate-smartdevelopment-lives-jobs-gdp [https://perma.cc/A7Z7-URXD].
10.
See Scott J. Shackelford & Timothy L. Fort, Sustainable Cybersecurity: Applying
Lessons from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (laying out the argument for applying concepts from the field of sustainable development
to addressing an array of cybersecurity issues).
11.
See Ostrom, supra note 5, at 8 ("[Free riders] enjoy the benefit of others' restraint in
using shared resources or others' contribution to collective action.").
12.
Id. at 6.
13.
However, it should be noted that fewer actors utilize the Internet than the
atmosphere, though more than three billion people were online as of March 2016. Countries,
INTERNET WORLD STATS (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.internetworldstats.com/list2.htm
[https://perma.cc/CUZ4-3MC4]
14.
Ostrom, supra note 5, at 8; see JONATHAN M. HARRIS & BRIAN ROACH, THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 8 (2009); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
[IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 18
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concentrated in a relatively small number of nations even as others
15
are becoming havens for cybercriminals.
Yet it is also true that actions taken by a multiplicity of actors
on small and medium scales can impact both the global climate
change problem and the cause of promoting a global culture of
cybersecurity. This relationship is part and parcel of the literature on
polycentric governance-sometimes called the Bloomington School of
Political Economy-which is quickly coming into vogue as the
preferred model of tackling "new" global collective action problems,
marking a shift from twentieth-century models of global commons
governance. 16 A "commons" is a general term meaning "a resource
shared by a group of people ....
."17 The notion of the global commons
posits that there are limits to national sovereignty in certain parts of
the world and that these areas should be "open to use by the
[international] community but closed to exclusive appropriation" by
treaty or custom. 1 8 At its height, the global commons comprised
nearly 75 percent of the Earth's surface, including the high seas and
Antarctica, as well as outer space, the atmosphere, and (some argue)
cyberspace.1 9 Some of these regions-particularly the deep seabed
and outer space-were gradually regulated to a greater or lesser
extent not by individual countries, but by the international
community at times through the vague Common Heritage of Mankind
(2013),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wgl/WGIAR5-SPM brochure-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3774-XRT9]; Overview of Impact, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, IPCC (Feb. 28,
2016), http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=55 [https://perma.ccFK73-QEMM].
15.

See Rachael King, Countries with the Most Cybercrime, BLOOMBERG BUS. (2012),

http://www.bloomberg.com/ss/O9/O7/O707_ceo-guide-security/1.htm [https://perma.cc/4H75-5GJ9]
(noting that the United States, China, and Germany together comprise nearly 40 percent of
global cybercrime); see also INT'L TELECOMMS. UNION [ITU], GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX &
CYBERWELLNESS PROFILES 1 (2015) (ranking nations in terms of their vulnerability to and
mitigation strategies for cyber attacks).
16.
See 1 ELINOR OSTROM & THE BLOOMINGTON SCH. OF POLITICAL ECON.,
POLYCENTRICITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 118 (Michael D. McGinnis

& Dan Cole eds., 2015).
17.
Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge
Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3, 3

(Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2006).
18.
CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, GOVERNING THE FROZEN COMMONS: THE ANTARCTIC
REGIME AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 222 (1998) (defining a global commons and positing

that Antarctica may qualify as a global commons suitable to the application of the CHM concept);
Geert van Calster, International Law and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF

LIFE

SUPPORT

SYSTEMS

2-3

(2015),

http://www.eolss.net/Sample-

Chapters/Cl4/El-36-01-04.pdf [https:/Hperma.cc/664G-AM6L].
19.
See, e.g., Mark E. Redden & Michael P. Hughes, Global Commons and Domain
Interrelationships:Time for a New Conceptual Framework?, 259 INST. ON

NAT'L STRATEGIC

STUDIES 1-3 (2010) (merging the traditional civilian definition of global commons, which
includes Antarctica, and emphasizing the importance to the US military of operating throughout
the global commons).

658

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 18:4:653

(CHM) concept that promotes the equitable distribution of scarce
resources. 20 More recently, this trend has reversed itself with the rise
of polycentric accords.
The "basic idea" of polycentric governance, according to
Professor Michael McGinnis, is that a group facing a collective action
problem "should be able to address" the problem in "whatever way
they [the members of the group] best see fit."21 This could include
22
using existing governance structures or crafting new systems.
Polycentric governance regimes that are multi-level, multi-purpose,
multi-type, and multi-sectoral in scope could complement the topdown governance model favored by policymakers throughout much of
the history of climate governance.2 3 This top-down model is also
present in Internet governance, which has enjoyed a more organic
development trajectory. Yet this trend is a double-edged sword with
many nations seeking to assert greater control online, challenging the
notion of cyberspace as a commons and further fracturing governance
24
at a time of increasing cyber insecurity.
Increasingly, leaders across an array of fields, from the
President of Estonia and the Director of the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to Nobel Laureates, have
proffered polycentric governance as the best path forward to
addressing the global collective action problems of climate change and
cyber attacks. 25 Surprisingly, there is a paucity of literature tracing

20.
See KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW xix-xx (1998) (describing the history of international efforts to bring the
seabed, ocean floor, and outer space resources, such as the moon, within the Common Heritage of
Mankind (CHM)).
21.
Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An
Equilibrium Concept and Examples from U.S. Health Care 1 (Vincent & Elinor Ostrom
Workshop in Political Theory & Pol'y Analysis at Indiana Univ., Paper No. Wl1-3, 2011),
http://php.indiana.edu/-mcginnis/Beijing-core.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYY4-8NTU].

22.
Id. at 1-2.
23.
Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to LAD and the Language of the Ostrom
Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POL'Y STUD. J. 163, 171 (2011) (defining
"polycentricity" as "a system of governance in which authorities from overlapping jurisdictions
(or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under which these authorities, as
well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the
constraints put upon their activities for public purposes").
24.
See Paul Tassi, The Philippines Passes a Cybercrime Prevention Act That Makes
SOPA Look Reasonable, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2012, 8:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
insertcoin2012/10/02/the -philippines-passes-the-cybercrime-prevention-act-that- makes-sopalook-reasonable/ [https://perma.cc/2JB9-N2B8].
25.
See Nancy Scola, ICANN Chief: "The Whole World Is Watching" the U.S.'s Net
Neutrality Debate, WASH.

POST (Oct. 7,

2014),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-

switch/wp/2 14/1 0/07/internet-operations-chief-snowden-disclosures-make-my-job-easier/
[https://perma.cc/YJ7B-C3YC].
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the promise and pitfalls of polycentricity across both regimes. 26 This
Article seeks to help begin such a conversation about the
cross-pollination of best practices between these and other global
commons arenas while offering a framework for how and why
governance of both the Internet and the atmosphere is changing to get
a better sense of where governance trends are heading and what we
all can do to help ensure a more sustainable future.
This Article investigates the extent to which the atmosphere
27
and cyberspace are reminiscent of other parts of the global commons,
such as the deep seabed and outer space, 28 in that they are
transitioning to a polycentric governance ecosystem. It also analyzes

26.
Cf. Myanna Dellinger, An Unstoppable Tide: CreatingEnvironmental and Human
Rights Law from the Bottom Up, 15 OR. REV. INT'L L. 63 (2013) (analyzing the potential of
polycentric governance to promote legal development in the fields of human rights and
environmental law). For background on the application of polycentric principles to the cause of
climate governance generally, see Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Rethinking a Failing Framework:
Adaptation and Institutional Rebirth for the Global Climate Change Regime, 25 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2012); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Transformation of
International Environmental Law, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241 (1995); Celeste Hammond, The
Evolving Role for TransactionalAttorneys Responding to Client Needs in Adapting to Climate
Change, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 543 (2013); Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A
Firm-Driven Approach to Global Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255 (2015);
Josephine van Zeben, Subsidiarity in European Environmental Law: A Competence Allocation
Approach, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 415 (2014). For a more general background on the
application of polycentric governance to addressing legal challenges from reconceptualizing
property rights to enhancing cybersecurity, see Amanda Craig, Scott J. Shackelford, & Janine
Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS.
L.J. 721 (2015); Jamie Prenkert & Scott J. Shackelford, Business, Human Rights, and the
Promiseof Polycentricity, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 451 (2014); Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L.
Fort, & Jamie Prenkert, How Businesses Can Promote Cyber Peace, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 353
(2015); Scott J. Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, A State-Centric Cyber Peace? Analyzing the
Current State and Impact of National Cybersecurity Strategies on Enhancing Global
Cybersecurity, N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2016); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Using
BITs to Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber Peace and Safeguarding Trade Secrets through Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford, Neither Magic Bullet Nor
Lost Cause: Land Titling and the Wealth of Nations, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 272 (2014).
27.
Robert 0. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change
(Harvard Kennedy Sch., Discussion Paper 10-33, 2009), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/KeohaneVictorFinal_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ88-NUZD]
(arguing that a "global
commons" is a descriptive term referring to "a resource that it is difficult or impossible to exclude
others from enjoying but that is degraded by use") (later published as Robert 0. Keohane &
David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 7
(2009)); see also CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, GOVERNING THE FROZEN COMMONS: THE ANTARCTIC
REGIME AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 221, 255 (1998) (discussing the global commons in the
context of Antarctic governance).
28.
See Scott J. Shackelford, Was Selden Right? The Expansion of Closed Seas and Its
Consequences, 47 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2, 22 (2011) (taking a similar approach analyzing the
expansion of closed seas and its consequences); see also Scott J. Shackelford, Governing the Final
Frontier:A Polycentric Approach to Managing Space Weaponization and Debris, 51 AM. BUS. L.J.
429, 430-33 (2014) (analyzing the extent to which polycentric governance may help mitigate the
dual issues of orbital debris and space weaponization).
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both the policy and practical implications of this transition. Part II
examines the forces shaping climate change policies and Internet
governance by focusing on technological advancement, resource
scarcity, and multipolar politics. Part II then applies lessons from the
history of cyberspace to contemporary issues in atmospheric
governance. To this end, Part III traces the evolution of the climate
change regime focusing both on the top-down UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change and bottom-up bilateral and regional
efforts. Part IV then compares and contrasts this history with that of
Internet governance.
The potential of polycentric governance to
mitigate the two global collective action problems of climate change
and cyber attacks is assessed in Part V along with a study of regime
effectiveness across both regimes.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY, RESOURCE SCARCITY, AND
MULTIPOLAR POLITICS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CYBER ATTACKS
Three variables provide a useful analytical framework for
investigating the evolution of both climate and Internet governance.
First, the technological advancements that gave birth to cyberspace
are also shaping both the pace of climate change and the manner in
which it may be addressed.2 9 Second, growing resource scarcity is
shaping governance decisions in both domains, as it exists across the
global commons. 30 Third, the structural variable of multipolar politics
that has evolved subsequent to the end of the Cold War and the
United States' "unipolar moment" is fracturing multilateral forums
and has made reaching consensus on governance questions
increasingly difficult. Each variable is introduced and analyzed in the
context of the tragedy of the atmospheric and cyber pseudo
commons.31

29.
See Adnan Z. Amin, The Economics of Renewable Energy: Falling Costs and Rising
Employment, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2015, 1:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adnanz-aminthe-economics-of-renewabl b 7452996.html [https://perma.cc/82M9-VK3H].
30.
See, e.g., Shane Streifel, John Baffes, & Betty Dow, Global Commodity Watch,
WORLD BANK (Sept. 21, 2010), http://blogs.worldbank.org/prospects/global- commodity- watch-0
[https://perma.cc/47JK-A5YC] (reporting changes in commodity prices from 1980 to 2010); see
Patrick M. Cronin, Foreword to SECURING FREEDOM IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS ix (Scott Jasper
ed., 2010).
31.
The pseudo commons represents a compromise position between competing models
of cyber regulation, namely those espousing Internet sovereignty and Internet freedom. See
JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., CYBER POWER15 (May 2010), http:/Ibelfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyberpower.pdf (referring to cyberspace as an "imperfect commons"); Press Release, Ind. Univ.,
London Conference Reveals 'Fault Lines' in Global Cyberspace and Cybersecurity Governance
(Nov. 7, 2011), http://newsinfo.iu.edu/news/page/normal/20236.html [https://perma.cc/CEB2CPXC]; see also SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE 54 (2014). It should also be noted that
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A. Technological Advancements
In many ways, the history of the Internet can be read as a story
highlighting the triumph of technology and group innovation. 32
Cyberspace is a unique portion of the global commons in that it is the
only regime that is artificial. As such, technological improvement not
only helps scale functionality in cyberspace, making it arguably the
fastest growing portion of the global commons, but technology also
introduces technical vulnerabilities that threaten to undermine public
trust in the system. For example, modern smartphones can be used as
microphones even when they are turned off, 33 and Microsoft found
that malware installation was part of the personal computer
production process in East Asian factories. 34 The explosion in Internet
usage enabled by technological advancements has also put a strain on
existing Internet governance structures, pushing ICANN, for example,
to expand the number of Top-Level Domains it offers even as some
nations seek to strengthen their "cyber sovereignty. '' 35
Such
developments help illustrate the extent to which technological
advancement is intimately intertwined with Internet governance even
if there is no single magic bullet to neutralize these threats.
Similar to cyberspace, technological advancements played an
important role in the rate of global climate change; the atmospheric
concentration of greenhouse gases rose dramatically during the
industrial revolution, and the greenhouse gas production rate
other variables doubtless also play an important role in shaping how and why these regimes
have evolved in the ways in which they have, such as implicit national security concerns, but
have been factored to the extent possible within these three meta variables.
32.
See generally WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS: HOW A GROUP OF HACKERS,
GENIUSES, AND GEEKS CRATED THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION (2014).

33.
See Christopher Bucktin, Spies Can Listen to Your iPhone Microphone Even If It Is
Switched OFF, Experts Reveal, DAILY MIRROR
(June 10,
2014,
3:29
PM),
http://www.mirror.co.uklnews/technology-science/technology/spies-can-listen-your-iphone3670347 [https://perma.cc/GQD2-AA6U].
34.
Malware Inserted on PC Production Lines, Says Study, BBC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19585433 [https://perma.cc/FZT5-F2UE].
35.

China Internet:Xi Jinping Calls for 'Cyber Sovereignty,' BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2015),

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35109453 [https://perma.cc/9NK2-R683. For more on
this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford et al., Back to the Future of Internet Governance?, GEO. J.
INT'L AFF. (June 25, 2015), http://journal.georgetown.edufback-to-the-future-of-internetgovernance [https://perma.cc/CWS3-DURQ]. The end of each domain name (i.e., "dot-org" or "dotcom") indicates the top-level domain (TLD). First New Generic Top-Level Domains Delegated,
INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NOS. [ICANN] (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.icann.org/
en/news/press/releases/release-23oct13-en [https://perma.cc/P4RW-8EW3]; New Generic TopLevel Domains, ICANN (Feb. 28, 2016), http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/announcements-andmedia/video/overview-en [https:/perma.cc/N2ZB-7BWF]. There are more country codes than
countries because country-code TLDs are sometimes given to disputed territories. For a list of
current TLDs, see Root Zone Database,INTERNET ASSIGNED NOS. AUTH. lANA] (Feb. 28, 2016),
http://www.iana.org/domains/root/db/ [https://perma.cc/DL3R-25UV].
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accelerated after World War 11.36 Technology is also part of the
solution to climate change, from energy efficiency innovations, such as
breakthroughs in battery technologies, to the rise in alternative
energy vehicles and distributed power generation. 37 However, as
President Obama has stated, there is not one solution to the problem
of global climate change. 38 Instead, an all-of-the-above approach is
39
needed to meet global renewable energy targets.
B. Demand for Services and Resource Scarcity
Although few might realize it given the rate at which the
Internet has successfully scaled, 40 some aspects of cyberspace are
increasingly scarce, including Internet Protocol (IP) address space. IP
addresses are made up of 32-bit binary strings. "Bits" are the Is and
Os (electronic pulses and non-pulses) of computer-speak.
An IP
version 4 (IPv4) address is the equivalent representation of a 32-bit
binary string, which is split into four eight-bit sequences known as
"bytes" that also correspond to one of the decimal strings. 4 1 Created in
1981, IPv4 allowed the creation of more than four billion IP addresses,
which early Internet architects thought would be sufficient for
expansion. 42 They were wrong.
Europe started rationing IPv4
43
addresses in September 2012.

36.
What Are the Greenhouse Gas Changes Since the Industrial Revolution?, AM.
CONST. Soc'Y (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/climatescience/greenhousegases/
industrialrevolution.html [https://perma.cc/D5V4-V3YG].
37.
See, e.g., The Clean Energy Economy in Three Charts, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY (Jan. 6,
2014, 5:55 PM), http://energy.gov/articles/clean-energy-economy-three-charts [https://perma.cc/
9E8K-ALXV].
38.
See Jason Furman & Jim Stock, New Report: The All-of-the-Above Energy Strategy
as a Path to Sustainable Economic Growth, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT (May 29, 2014, 11:30 AM), https://www.whitehouse.govblog/2014/05/29/new-reportall-above-energy-strategy- path-sustainable- economic-growth [https://perma.cc/8KKA-M8NT].
39.
Id.
40.
See DNSSEC-The Path to a Secure Domain, INT'L INFRASTRUCTURE FOUND. (Feb.
28, 2016), https://www.iis.se/english/domains/techddnssec/ fhttps://perma.ccT7ZS-YQBB].
41.
George Ou, IP Subnetting Made Easy, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 25, 1016, 4:25 AM),
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/data-center/ip-subnetting-made-easy- 125343! [https://perma.cc/
MM6V-C2EL].
42.
See, e.g., Robert McMillan, Coming This Summer: U.S. Will Run Out of Internet
Addresses, WALL ST.J. (May 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/coming-this-summer-u-s-willrun-out-of-internet-addresses-1431479401; John Brzozowski, IPv4 Depletion Not the Beginning
of the End, it's Just the End of the Beginning, COMCAST (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/ipv4-depletion-not-the-beginning-of-the-end-its-justthe-end-of-the -beginning.
43.
See Mark Ward, Europe Hits Old Internet Address Limits, BBC NEWS (Sept. 14,
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19600718
[https://perma.cc/Q9EH-LW4C]. Many
countries have complained that IANA's IPv4 allocation unfairly favored the United States. See
Yang Jingde & Liu Yang, Interview: Internet IP Addresses Not Exhausted: ITU Official, XINHUA
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Since 1992, engineers have been designing and attempting to
implement a new system called IP version 6 (IPv6), which features a
larger address space-on the order of billions of IP addresses for each
person alive in 2013. Architects again imagine this scale to be
inexhaustible. 44 Time will tell whether this view is accurate. As with
IP address scarcity, there are also issues of overuse that can occur in
cyberspace. For example, spam messages consume limited bandwidth,
which have been called a form of "information pollution," 45 and
distributed denial of service attacks can cause targeted websites to
46
crash because of too many requests for site access.
As with cyberspace, there are many ways to conceptualize
scarcity in terms of the climate. One is, simply put, the limited
amount of clean air on the earth. Numerous authors, including,
Professor Peter Barnes, have analyzed the tragedy of the atmospheric
commons, which predicts the gradual overexploitation of all common
pool resources-including oceans and the atmosphere. 47
The
atmosphere has a limited storage capacity, meaning that property
rights must be defined so as to curtail the open access nature of the
climate as well as mitigate the destructive behavior of free riders,
such as through mechanisms like cap and trade systems. 48 This
process, in essence, can turn a medium as amorphous as the
atmosphere into something as definite as a parking garage; as
Professor Barnes explains, "Whoever gets the [parking] spaces can use

(Feb. 14, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english201O/business/2011-02/14/c_13730415.htm
[https://perma.cc/ET24-T69D]. There has been a movement to ensure that IPv6 allocations are
more equitable. See ITU and IPv6, ITU (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.itu.int/net/ITU-T/ipv6/
[https://perma.cc/X922-X2QJ].
44.
See Kaushik Das, Top 10 Features That Make IPv6 'Greater'than IPv4, IPV6 (Feb.
28,
2016),
http://ipv6.com/articles/general/Top- 10- Features-that-make -IPv6-greater-thanIPv4.htm [https://perma.cc/8V6L-G8XS].
45.
David A. Bray, Information Pollution, Knowledge Overload, Limited Attention
Spans, and Our Responsibilities as IS Professionals 1 (Glob. Info. Tech. Mgmt. Ass'n World
Conference, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=962732 [https://perma.cc/9526-GYNP]; see also Roger
Hurwitz, The Prospectsfor Regulating Cyberspace: A Schematic Analysis on the Basis of Elinor
Ostrom,"General Framework for Analyzing Sustainabilityof Social Ecological Systems," 325 SCI.
419, 419-22 (2009) (arguing that aside from bandwidth, "the more important common pool
resource is public or shared trust" that may be breached through cyber insecurities).
46.
See, e.g., Jonathan A. Ophardt, Cyber Warfare and the Crime of Aggression: The
Need for Individual Accountability on Tomorrow's Battlefield, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 2-6,
10 n.35 (describing how distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have been used in
conjunction with more conventional warfare tools, such as in the 2008 conflict between Russia
and Georgia in South Ossetia, but arguing that such country-wide tactics would be more difficult
in countries with greater interconnectivity, such as the United States).
47.

See PETER BARNES, WHO OWNS THE SKY? OUR COMMON ASSETS AND THE FUTURE OF

CAPITALISM 34-35 (2003); David Feeny et al., The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years
Later, 18 HUM. ECOLOGY 1, 1 (1990).

48.

See BARNES, supra note 47, at 36.

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 18:4:653

them, trade them, or sell them, but once the garage is full, that's it. '' 49
Much of the difficulty in the ongoing climate negotiations discussed
below turns on this question of which nations can pollute and to what
degree. More explicitly, the question is how should property rights to
clean air be distributed-how much clean air should go to developed
nations that have enjoyed the status quo open access system and how
much should go to less-developed nations. Indeed, very similar
debates are occurring now with regard to allocating IPv6 address
50
space.
C. MultipolarPolitics
The rise of multipolar politics has made it increasingly difficult
to reach consensus through multilateral forums, such as the United
Nations. 51 The UK Ministry of Defense sums up the situation
succinctly: "Out to 2040, the locus of global power will move away
from the United States... and Europe towards Asia, as the global
system shifts from a uni-polar towards a multi-polar distribution of
power." 52 With the rise of multipolar (multiple power center) politics
and the "Rest,"53 distinctions between the West and the East,
developing and developed countries, and the North and the South are
impacting the development of international law generally 4 and both
climate and cyber law specifically. 55 Indeed, the rise of new public and
private cyber powers underscores this shift in international

49.
See id.
50.
See,
e.g.,
ITU
[https://perma.cc/GA3S-XDQX].
51.

and

IPv6,

ITU,

http://www.itu.int/net/ITU-T/ipv6/

See EVERETTr C. DOLMAN, ASTROPOLITIK: CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS IN THE SPACE AGE

13-15 (2002) (defining geopolitics as "the study of states as spatial phenomena, with a view
towards understanding the geographical bases of power[,]" and astropolitics as "the study of the
relationship between outer space terrain and technology, and the development of political and
military policy and strategy").
52.
DEv., CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE CTR., MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, STRATEGIC TRENDS
PROGRAMME:
GLOBAL
STRATEGIC
TRENDS--OUT
TO
2040,
2010,
at
10
(UK),

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data/file/33717/GST4 v9 F
ebl0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C38S-XNQG] [hereinafter DCDC].
53.
The
Rise
of
the
Rest,
FAREED
ZAKARIA
(May
3,
2008),
http://fareedzakaria.com/2008/05/12/the-rise-of-the -rest/ [https://perma.cc/G4KU-5XVJ]. But see
Richard N. Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
May-June, 2008, at 45 (arguing for a nonpolar over a multipolar world order and stating that
"[s]tates are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by
militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in many places.").
54.

See Matthew

Happold, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR

WORLD 2 (Matthew Happold ed., 2012).
55.

See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 9 (1991)

(discussing the importance of power distribution among states in forming international law).
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relations, 56 complicating international efforts to reach consensus on
improving cybersecurity through multilateral organizations5 7 even as
58
the political and economic costs of the cyber threat mount.
Similarly, the difficulty faced by the international in reaching a
binding climate accord from the Kyoto Protocol to the 2015 Paris
Agreement showcases both the difficulty of relying exclusively on the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process and the
After all, even the Paris
promise of a polycentric approach.
Agreement itself relies heavily on voluntary national reduction
pledges to meet its greenhouse gas reduction goals.5 9 This situation
stands in marked contrast to other global commons regimes, such as
the law of the sea and outer space, that were largely negotiated during
the Cold War at a time when agreement among the few principal
powers-particularly the two superpowers-meant relatively quick
60
regulatory advances, as is discussed further below.
Technological progress, resource scarcity, and the rise of
multipolar politics are all exerting pressure on the form of both
climate and Internet governance. Regulatory change must keep pace
with technical, political, and economic change if the tragedies of the
atmospheric and cyber pseudo commons are to be mitigated.6 1 In
order to determine whether such regulatory change is occurring with
sufficient speed, the evolution of climate law and policy as well as
56.

See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Excerpt: Zakaria's 'The Post-American World,"NEWSWEEK

(May
3,
2008),
http://www.newsweek.com/excerpt-zakarias-post-american-world-89645
[https://perma.cc/6V-FP-TDBJ] (conveying the perceived sentiment that the United States no
longer dominates in many areas seen to denote global power). But see Haass, supra note 53
(arguing for the emergence of "a nonpolar international system ... characterized by numerous
centers with meaningful power").
57.

See COMM'N ON GLOB. GOVERNANCE,

OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD 10 (1995)

(observing that the emerging global power structure has altered the way the international
community can and does react to international problems); Danielle Kelh & Tim Maurer, Did the
U.N. Internet Governance Summit Actually Accomplish Anything?, SLATE (Dec. 14, 2012, 4:43

PM),http://www.slate.com/blogs/future-tense/2012/12/14/wcit_2012 has ended did the u-n inte
rnet-governance-summit accomplish anything.html [https:/perma.cc/H6RP-HFCQ] (reporting
on difficulties during a December 2012 Internet governance conference reviewed in Chapter 7).
58.
See REIN MOJLLERSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW, RIGHTS AND POLITICS: DEVELOPMENTS
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CIS 38-40 (1994) (discussing the shifting character of international

relations after the end of the Cold War); Mark MacCarthy, What Payment IntermediariesAre
Doing About Online Liability and Why It Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1114 (2010)

(analyzing the potential for a tragedy of the cyber commons); Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom
Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, at Al.
59.
See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris,
N.Y. Times (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-change[https://perma.cc/
accord-paris.html?emc=edit na 20151212&nlid=52536178&ref=cta&_r=0
TJ5B-AG6P].
60.
See infra Part III.A.
61.

Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968) (discussing

the causes of the classic tragedy of the commons).
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Internet governance must be reviewed to provide a foundation for
analysis.
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive
grounding in the history of climate law and policy. Numerous helpful
and up-to-date volumes are already available on that topic. 62 Rather,
the goal here is to briefly survey the literature with a special emphasis
on the role played by technological advancement, scarcity, and
multipolar politics on driving the type and pace of regulatory change
before comparing these developments with the field of Internet
governance. Special attention is paid to the post-Kyoto Protocol
timeframe, particularly the events surrounding the 2009 Copenhagen
Accord. What has come since this era is the most relevant for
discussions of the 2015 UN Conference of the Parties in Paris
(COP21). Increasingly polycentric regulatory structures are being
favored by environmental stakeholders, as has long been the case in
cyberspace, setting up a comparative analysis of best practices
undertaken in Part V.
A. Early History: 1972 Stockholm Conference to the 1992 Earth
Summit
The birth of the modern international environmental law
movement may be traced in many ways to Rachel Carson's 1962 book,
Silent Spring, which documented the effects of widespread pesticide
use in the United States.6 3 The public outcry following its publication
was intense and grew over time, touching off an array of
environmental movements focusing on issues ranging from toxic waste
to air and water pollution. These efforts culminated in the first Earth
Day on April 22, 1970, which remains the largest public
demonstration in US history with more than twenty million
Americans participating. 64 Such a groundswell of support laid the
foundation for a slew of environmental legislation in the United
States, from the 1970 Clean Air Act to the 1973 Endangered Species

62.
See, e.g., JOYEETA GUPTA, THE HISTORY OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE (2014).
63.
See, e.g., DDT: A Brief History and Status, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/chemicals/ddt-brief-history-status.htm [https://perma.cc/
JLC6-ESJS].
64.
See Earth Day: The History of a Movement, EARTH DAY NETWORK,
http://www.earthday.org/about/the-history-of-earth-day/ [https:l/perma.cc/F564-Q3PV].
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Act and the 1977 Clean Water Act. 65 Indeed, this mass movement was
so successful that it quickly spread beyond US shores to an array of
nations that similarly passed groundbreaking environmental
legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration,
arguably the first major modern global environmental conference,
gave voice to this movement and helped further awaken stakeholders
around the world as to the importance of environmental protection.
The Declaration's first principle states in part that humans have the
right to "an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and
well-being .... The role of scientists was central throughout this
period, even more so when it came time to address the problem of
ozone depletion through what came to be known as the Montreal
67
Protocol.
Much like Rachel Carson's Silent Spring helped jumpstart a
global conversation about the state of environmental protection, an
article by three British scientists helped precipitate arguably the most
successful
international
treaty
in history-the
Montreal
Protocol-which in 2009 became the first UN treaty to achieve
universal ratification. 68 The story of the Montreal Protocol began in
1984 when Joseph Farman, Brian Gardiner, and Jonathan Shanklin
discovered a long-hypothesized springtime hole in the ozone layer over
Antarctica and published their findings in Nature one year later. 69
This revelation touched off a sequence of events that culminated just
two years later with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer. 70 A prime example of a successful targeted treaty in
the climate-change context, an initially small group of nations worked
to ban the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that destroy ozone under
"6

65.
See generally U.S. Laws & Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations [https://perma.cc/BLC9-UMUE].
66.
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, § II, 1,U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14Rev.1 (June 5-6,
1972), http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503
[https://perma.cc/98VH-5YPE]; see also G.A. Res. 2994 (XXVII) Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment (Dec. 15, 1972).
67.
See Richard E. Benedick, Science, Diplomacy, and the Montreal Protocol, EARTH
ENCYCLOPEDIA (June 12, 2007), http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/155895/ [https://perma.cc/
5ZG9-LB4A].
68.
See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Key Achievements of the
Montreal Protocol to Date (July 3, 2009), http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MPKeyAchievements-E.pdf [https:/perma.cc/TF6N-A742] [hereinafter Key Achievements].
69.
THE OZONE HOLE, http://www.theozonehole.com/ [https://perma.cc/B2MC-R95K]; see
J.C Farman, B.G. Gardiner & J.D. Shanklin, Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal
Seasonal ClO/NOx Interaction, NATURE (May 16, 1985), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/
v315/n6016/abs/315207a0.html [https:/perma.cc/YD4R-DL4K].
70.
See The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Annex III,
Art. 1(1), 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (1987); S. Exec. Res. No. 100-10 (1987).
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this agreement. 71 As of 2009, the myriad benefits of the Montreal
Protocol include a 98 percent reduction in CFCs, more than twenty
million cataract cases avoided in the United States alone, and a
reduction of twenty-five billion tons of greenhouse gas (GHG)
72
emissions-arguably more than the Kyoto Protocol.
Why has the Montreal Protocol been so successful, and what
lessons does it hold for climate change and, for that matter,
cybersecurity? In short, the science was clear, scarcity was plain,
alternatives were available, and geopolitics was simpler. The science
linking CFCs and the hole in the ozone was well established and
apparent, whereas in the climate-change context, atmospheric
transition is gradual and is not always as straightforward or attention
grabbing as a massive and expanding hole over Antarctica.7 3 In other
words, the dangers from excessive greenhouse gas emissions can be
more indirect, and on a longer timescale, than the destruction of the
ozone layer. Similarly, how many and what type of cyber attacks will
it take to reach a tipping point pushing the world into collective
action?
Former George W. Bush Administration Cybersecurity
Advisor Richard Clarke, for example, envisions a scenario in which the
tipping point is never reached, but instead small-scale losses in IP
'74
mount to result in a "death of a thousand cuts.
Second, the scarcity and fragility of ozone was made clear by
the scientists' findings, while CFCs were traced to a relatively small
number of manufacturing sectors in a handful of nations. Instead of a
multi-billion dollar CFC industry in a minority of countries, global
climate change impacts multi-trillion dollar industries across myriad
sectors and economies. The scale of the problem thus makes climate
change exceedingly more difficult to manage than the ozone
hole-similar to the multifaceted cyber threat.
Moreover, the ozone layer heals itself. So too does the climate,
but on a much longer timescale.7 5
The distributed nature of

71.

See Daniel Bodansky, The History of the Global Climate Change Regime, in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 23, 29-35 (Urs Luterbacher & Detlef

F. Sprinz eds., 2001) (noting that the Montreal Protocol was precipitated by national regulation).
72.
See Key Achievements, supra note 68.
73.
See Pamela S. Chasek et al., Ozone Depletion, in THE GLOBALIZATION READER 526,
526-30 (Frank J. Lechner & John Boli eds., 2014).
74.
Ron Rosenbaum, Richard Clarke on Who Was Behind the Stuxnet Attack,
SMITHSONIAN (Apr. 2012), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/Richard-Clarkeon-Who-Was-Behind-the-Stuxnet-Attack.html?c=y&story=fullstory [https://perma.cc/9943-V7C7].
75.
James Samenow, Ozone Layer is Healing, Expected to Recover by Around 2050,
Major Report Finds, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capitalweather-gang/wp/20 14/09/11/ozone-layer- is -healing-expected -to-recover-by- around- 2050- majorreport-finds/ [https://perma.cc/7JQC-ASK3]. But see Richard Harris, Global Warming Is
Irreversible, Study
Says,
NAT L
PUB.
RADIO
(Jan.
26,
2009
8:34
PM),
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cyberspace similarly means that it is robust; indeed, it could
theoretically survive a nuclear war. Though, like the climate, nothing
can protect it from geopolitics. 76 Third, a clear substitute to CFCs was
7
also available, 77 unlike for all carbon emissions or the Internet. 8 It
was just a matter of incentivizing the switch to the substitute, which
required payments. However, these payments were small relative to
the problem of climate change-the US government has paid out
roughly $21 billion over the life of the Montreal Protocol, 79 which can
be compared to the more than $100 billion annual fund envisioned
under many climate policy scenarios.8 0 Third, the Montreal Protocol
was passed during the end of the Cold War at a time in which
superpower collaboration helped engender global agreement, such as
81
may be seen during the so-called "golden age" of space law.
International relations had transformed by the time of the 1992 Earth
Summit that gave birth to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), complicating the playing field with an array of
public and private power centers that helped to lay the groundwork
82
for the polycentric ecosystem of the present.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=99888903
(noting certain exceptions).
76.

[https://perma.cc/ZH2C-ULSE]

ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE

ENVIRONMENT 63 (2006) (noting that the idea that the Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network (ARPANET) was created as a military communications network designed to withstand
a nuclear strike is an urban myth, and that that goal in fact came from a Rand study, which is a
global policy nonprofit).
See Kal Raustiala, Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate Regime, in INTERNATIONAL
77.
RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 71, at 95, 102.
See Michael V. Copeland, The Internet Needs a Plan B, WIRED (Feb. 27, 2013, 3:16
78.
[https://perma.cc/
PM),
http://www.wired.comfbusiness/2013/02/the-internet-needs-a-plan-b/
WT7H-NP89] (reporting on Danny Hillis, an early Internet pioneer who argues that we need to
build a Plan B for if and when the public Internet crashes).
Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal vs. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols 15 (Univ. of Chi. Law
79.
Sch. John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 302, 2006),
www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/302.pdf [https://perma.ccMN2D-VLEL].
80.
See Financial, Technology and Capacity-Building Support, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://cancun.unfccc.intfinancial-technology-

[https://perma.cc/454Uand-capacity-building-support/new-long-term-funding-arrangements/
MYKS].
81.
See FRANK LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 37 (2009). The phrase
"golden age," while popular in the literature, is misleading since this period of progress in
multilateral treaty making in the deep seabed and outer space was also marred by deep political
divides and security concerns. It is used here merely as shorthand referring to the period
extending from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to the 1982 Moon Treaty.
See, e.g., Christopher Joyce, Climate Strategists: To Cut Emissions, Focus On
82.
Forests, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/1O/143454111/climate[https://perma.cc/LV9U-XJSA]
activists-to-cut-emissions -focus-on-forests?sc=17&f-1001
(reporting that some nations, such as Norway, are looking outside the UN framework for action
on climate change).
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Twenty years after the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, another
unprecedented UN conference was held. It drew together 172 nations,
hundreds of thousands of people (including nearly ten thousand
journalists alone), and some 2,400 nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).8 3 Despite the slew of participants, the Earth Summit, also
known as the Rio Summit, had a lofty purpose and was actually
productive (in contrast to later gatherings, such as Copenhagen,
discussed below)-producing the Declaration on Environment and
Development, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change itself.8 4 The objective of

the UNFCCC is to "stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system."8 5 The much broader scope of
these negotiations as compared to those surrounding the Montreal
Protocol is immediately apparent, covering everything from public
transportation and clean water to fossil fuel alternatives.8 6 Because of
the broad ambit of covered activities, the 154 nations that originally
signed onto the UNFCCC only agreed to a voluntary, non-binding aim
of reducing atmospheric GHG concentrations to 1990 levels by 2000, a
goal that many countries did not meet.8 7 In other words, it was an
agreement to agree, which would be filled out through annual
conference of the parties (COP) gatherings that have taken place since
the 1995 COP1 in Berlin, as shown in Figure 1.
The responsibilities of developed and developing nations under
the UNFCCC process highlight the tidal changes underway in both
geopolitics and the global economy in the early 1990s with the end of
the Cold War and the beginning of the United States' so-called
"unipolar moment" that corresponded with the rise of emerging

83.
See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(Aug. 12, 1992),
http://www.un.org/geninfofbp/enviro.html [https://perma.cc/NCB4-NS3R].
84.
Id.; United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
79; United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Framework Convention on
Climate Change, June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; S. TREATY DOC No.
103-20 (1993).
85.
UNFCCC, supra note 84, at art. 2; see DONALD A. BROWN, CLIMATE CHANGE ETHICS:
NAVIGATING THE PERFECT MORAL STORM 138 (2013).
86.
STEPHANIE MEAKIN, THE Rio EARTH SUMMIT: SUMMARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1992), http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-

R/LoPBdP/BP/bp317-e.htm [https://perma.cc/SZQ8-D7C2].
87.
UNFCCC, supra note 84, at art. 2; History of Kyoto Protocol, CTR. FOR CLIMATE &
ENERGY

SOLUTIONS,

http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/kyoto-protocol/history

[https://perma.cc/B4DV-22MJ].
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markets.8 8 Developed states, known as Annex I countries in the
UNFCCC universe, are required to "adopt national policies and take
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of GHG and protecting and
enhancing its GHG sinks and reservoirs. 8' 9 Annex II nations, then,
are leading developed nations (OECD countries) which pay mitigation
costs for developing nations, known as non-Annex I nations, reflecting
the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities to manage the
Thus, the emphasis for developing states
problem of scarcity.
remained economic development, highlighting the continuing
These
of defining "sustainable development." 90
difficulty
differences-including such contentious topics as the amount of
adaptation funding and technology transfer schemes-were brought to
the forefront when it came time to fill in the UNFCCC with
particulars through the guise of a protocol negotiated in Kyoto, Japan.
B. Kyoto to Copenhagen: The UnipolarMoment Wanes
By 1995, it became evident to many stakeholders that
voluntary emission reductions envisioned under the 1992 UNFCCC
were inadequate to mitigate the threat of global climate change.
Thus, negotiations began at COP1 to strengthen the global response,
eventually resulting two years later in the Kyoto Protocol.9 1 This
binding agreement, the first treaty to mandate GHG reductions,
required developed nations to reduce their emissions by an average of
5.2 percent below 1990 levels by 2012 (although enforcement was left
unspecified). Among other things, the Kyoto Protocol established a
global trading system called the Clean Development Mechanism that
permitted countries to earn credits and purchase offsets to be put
toward their emission targets, which has faced criticism even as the
agreement has grown in importance.9 2 The Protocol entered into legal
88.
See Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 1990),
[https://perma.cc/3YZBhttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-02-01/unipolar-moment
5JNS].
UNFCCC, supra note 84, at art. 3.
89.
Sustainable development is defined in the Brundtland Report as "development that
90.
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs." Rep. of the World Comm'n on Env't and Dev.: Our Common Future (1987),
transmitted to the General Assembly as an Annex, 37, U.N. Doc. A/42/427; see also
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 78 (Sept. 25) (defining sustainable
development as the "need to reconcile economic development with protection of the
environment").
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
91.
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
92.
See, e.g., Michael W. Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's
Performance and Potential,55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1761-63 (2008).
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force on February 16, 2005, when fifty-five nations had ratified it. 93
Ultimately, the Kyoto Protocol has been successful in terms of
participation; 191 nations have ratified the agreement since 1997, but
several large emitters, including Australia, Canada (which ratified the
agreement but subsequently pulled out), and most notably the United
States, remain outside the system. 9 4 Kyoto's firm commitment period,
which began in 2008, was scheduled to end in 2012 but was
subsequently extended beyond 2012 by the Doha Agreement to
provide a bridge toward a more inclusive and comprehensive global
95
climate treaty discussed below in the context of COP21.
Despite the success of the Kyoto Protocol, the agreement was
still insufficient to define and enshrine sustainable development in
international law. Some commentators criticized the agreement as
not being ambitious enough, while others focused on the fact that it
only bound developed nations, though most of the growth in emissions
was already coming from emerging markets. 96
This argument
highlights the fact that, even though the United States remained the
only economic, political, and military superpower in the late 1990s,
the rise of other stakeholders was already affecting climate
negotiations. Moreover, the pace of both technological change and
economic growth quickened, particularly in the 2000s with China
overtaking the United States in GHG emissions by 2006, 97 and it soon
became clear the notion of leaving developing countries out of a final
climate agreement was untenable. Yet, despite rising urgency from
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, a push
for a new treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol happened only
gradually, coming to a head more than a decade later in 2009 during
the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15).9 8 This process is in
contrast to the two years it took to negotiate and ratify the Montreal
Protocol, demonstrating that in an era increasingly defined by

93.
See Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/26/world/kyotoprotocol-fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/K3W8-PFTA].
94.

Id.

95.
See, e.g., Karl Ritter & Michael Casey, UN Climate Conference: Kyoto Protocol
Extended at Doha, Qatar Talks, ASSOc.
PRESS (Dec.
8, 2012,
4:33 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/08/un-climate-conference-kyoto-doha-qatar-n2262371.html [https://perma.ccIU7DV-7GPE].
96.
See, e.g., Helen Dewar & Kevin Sullivan, Senate Republicans Call Kyoto Pact Dead,
WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1997, at A37.
97.
See China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (June 20,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/2O/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html?r=0 [https://perma.cc/8ATU-LFW5].
98.
See David Adam, From Kyoto to Copenhagen, WASH. MONTHLY (2009),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2009/0907.adam.html
[https://perma.cc/CH7UQTTQ].
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multipolar politics and rising scarcity, scientific consensus had become
a necessary but insufficient criterion of success.
C. COP15 Forward:Enter the Multipolar Status Quo
COP15 underscored the changing role of the United Nations,
the rise of multipolar politics and its effect on commons governance,
and rapid technological advancements alongside growing scarcity.
These issues are not limited to the atmosphere, but also apply to other
arenas of the global commons, including cyberspace. For example,
COP15 and the annual climate negotiations that followed demonstrate
the difficulty of reaching consensus between major emerging markets,
like the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) 99 and
other power centers, including the United States, the European
Union, and the G77. 100 The struggle to reach agreement across such
an array of stakeholders and interests has led to the development of
more targeted forums, both in terms of membership and subject
matter, in what could be considered a shift toward a polycentric
approach to atmospheric management. 10 1
Moreover, COP15 illustrated the extent to which negotiations
over implementing legal instruments that became part and parcel of
"old commons" regimes such as the deep seabed and outer space
have-like the CHM concept itself-changed over time.10 2 COP15 is
Also known as the BRICS, this group is not only "an economic concept but
99.
increasingly ... is also taking the form of a political entity." Haibin Niu, A Chinese Perspective
on the BRICS in 2015, COUNCIL OF COUNCILS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/p36088%20?cid=nlc-npbnews- 2015-national=
conference confirmation and background--link48-20150602&sp-mid=48790069&sprid
a3plZ3VyYUBjZnIub3JnSO [https://perma.cc/EH5N-7424].
See Key Powers Reach Compromise at Climate Summit, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2009),
100.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8421935.stm [https://perma.cc/RV8Q-V2GU]; see also About the
Group of 77, THE GROUP OF 77 AT THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.g77.org/doc/
[https:/perma.cc/37AZ-P9JZ] ("The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organization of
developing countries in the United Nations, which provides the means for the countries of the
South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint
negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations
system, and promote South-South cooperation for development.").
See Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance, 2 CLIMATE L.
101.
395, 395 (2011) (discussing the potential of polycentric governance to better address climate
change given the failures of multilateral efforts); see also Dave Keating, Climate Action Goes
National, EUR. VOICE (Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/climateaction-goes-nationalI78871.aspx [https://perma.cc/3UDM-Q49E] ("After the dramatic collapse of
the Copenhagen summit in 2009, there has been a retreat from the idea that climate change is
going to be fought through international action. The emphasis has shifted to 'voluntary national
measures' loosely co-ordinated at UN level.").
See generally Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the
102.
Common Heritage of Mankind, 35 IN'L & CoMP. L.Q. 190 (1986) (laying out the five contested
elements of the CHM concept). A precise definition of the CHM concept has never been specific
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thus a microcosm both of what is at stake in the "new commons" of the
atmosphere and cyberspace going forward and how politically,
economically, and legally difficult it is to create new, inclusive
governance structures to address global collective action problems.
During COP15, held in Copenhagen in December 2009,
delegations from 192 nations came together to address the mounting
problem of global climate change. 10 3 Yet by this point, and in part
because of the rise of multipolar politics in an arena designed for
consensus, the actions of a few nations were able to block progress for
several critical days. 10 4 At the heart of the debate was how the
atmosphere should be governed: what form should regulation take,
what is the most appropriate level for regulation, and how can
compliance be enforced? In the end, COP15 proved unable to answer
these questions, resulting in a last-minute, "lackluster" Copenhagen
Accord featuring voluntary emissions pledges that did not really
satisfy anyone. 10 5 As a result, the struggle to reach agreement across
such an array of interests has led to the development of more targeted
forums since COP15, both in terms of membership and subject matter,
in what could be considered a shift toward a polycentric approach to
atmospheric management. 10 6 For example, the US Conference of
Mayors climate protection efforts are an example of this movement,

as applied to outer space. In its most positive form, it fosters international cooperation to develop
and equitably distribute the benefits to common pool resources. Most conceptions of the CHM
share five primary elements. First, there can be no private or public appropriation of the
commons. Cf. LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

562 (1988) (noting that portions of the global commons may in fact be appropriated under
international law). Second, "representatives from all nations" must manage common resources.
Jennifer Frakes, Notes and Comments, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the
Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a
Compromise?, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 409, 412 (2003) (citing Barbara Ellen Heim, Note, Exploring the
Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep
Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 819, 827 (1990)). Third, all
nations must share in the benefits acquired through exploitation of the area. Id. at 412-13.
Fourth, the commons must be used for "peaceful purposes." Id. at 413. Fifth, the commons "must
be preserved for the benefit of future generations." Id.
103.
See Emma Duncan, Getting Warmer, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/14994872 [https://perma.cc/XU94-2YFB].
104.
See Key Powers Reach Compromise at Climate Summit, supra note 99.
105.
See Rhys Gerholdt, CopenhagenAccord Weekly Roundup: April 28, CLIMATE ACTION
(Apr.
28,
2010),
http://blog.usclimatenetwork.org/climate-negotiations/copenhagen-accordweekly-roundup-april-28/ [https://perma.cc/CEW2-PE4A]; see also Roger Harrabin, UN Climate
Talks Extend Kyoto Protocol, Promise Compensation, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20653018 [https://perma.cc/E97R-9QM9] (noting
that the Russian delegation tried to slow progress at COP18 but ultimately their objections were
put down by the Chairman); Matt McGrath, Last-Minute Deal Saves Fractious UN Climate
Talks, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-25067180
[https://perma.cc/3SBN-Z6B5].
106.
See Cole, supra note 101, at 395.
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with more than five hundred US mayors signing on to voluntary
efforts aimed at reducing emissions from their cities. 10 7 Such efforts
have been met with some success, which is why Professor Ostrom
argued that polycentric regulation is the best way to ensure that
multilateral treaties are reinforced by regional, bilateral, national,
and sub-national actors so as to help ensure that sufficient progress is
being made.1 08 This was the state of affairs heading into Paris in
December 2015.109

Year
1972
1979
1988
1989
1990

Figure 1. Key Dates in Global Climate Law and
Policy. 11 0
Event
Stockholm Declaration, First Global Environmental
Conference
First World Climate Conference
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change created
Montreal Protocol signed.
IPCC's first assessment report released. IPCC and
second World Climate Conference call for a global treaty
on climate change. UN General Assembly negotiations
on a framework convention begin.

107.
See About the Mayors' Climate Protection Center, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS,
http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/about.htm [https://perma.c/8DEU-VB3D].
108.
See Pedro Fidelman, Elinor Ostrom's Research Can Inspire Rio+20, EARTH
GOVERNANCE (Nov. 7, 2010), http://earthgovernance.org/tag/elinor-ostrom
[https://perma.cc/
SW5V-4538].
109.
There has been action between COP15 and COP21, but these have been changes in
degrees that have reinforced the polycentric status quo rather than a dramatic shift in approach.
For example, among other things: COP16 in Cancun required nations to submit information on
forest management practices; COP17 in Durban discussed the proposed $100 billion green fund
for developing nations to adapt to climate change (even as India remained defiant until the last
minute on reducing emissions as it would hamper economic development); COP18 in Qatar
extended Kyoto commitments to 2015; COP19 in Warsaw saw some progress on common but
differentiated responsibilities and a new "Warsaw International Mechanism" to provide
expertise, and possibly aid, to help developing nations cope with losses from extreme events
related to climate change; and COP20 in Lima witnessed new pledges for the Green Climate
Fund as well as the 'multilateral assessment' of emission-cutting efforts by developed
countries." See Outcomes of the U.N. Climate Conference in Lima, CTR. CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/cop-20-lima/summary
[https://perma.cc/8MCW-NSTW]; Factbox: Main Decisions at U.N. Climate Talks in Warsaw,
REUTERS (Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/23/us-climate-talks-factboxidUSBRE9AMOCA20131123
[https://perma.cc/AL2C-AVSE]
(summarizing
the
main
developments of COP19); Lauren Graham, Second Time Around: Reflections from COP17 to
COP18, YALE SCH. FORESTRY & ENVTL. STUD.: F&ES BLOG (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://environment.yae.edulblog/2012/12/second-time- around-reflections-from -cop 17-to-cop 18/
[https:/perma.cc/XQ9N-494A] (reviewing more recent developments from COP17 and COP18).
110.
Climate Change in Context, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/essential-background/items/
6031.php [https:Hperma.c/GVB9-DLLY]. For a more comprehensive timeline of the development
of global climate change law and policy, see GUPTA, supra note 62, at 41-43.
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Earth Summit-the UNFCCC is opened for signature
along with its sister Rio Conventions.
The first Conference of the Parties (COPI) takes place in
Berlin.
The UNFCCC Secretariat is set up to support action
under the Convention.
Kyoto Protocol formally adopted in December at COP3.
IPCC's Third Assessment Report released. Bonn
Agreements adopted, based on the Buenos Aires Plan of
Action of 1998. Marrakesh Accords adopted at COP7,
detailing rules for implementation of Kyoto Protocol,
setting up new funding and planning instruments for
adaptation, and establishing a technology transfer
framework.
Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. The first
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP1)
takes place in Montreal.
IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report released. Climate
science entered into popular consciousness. At COP13,
Parties agreed on the Bali Road Map, which charted the
way towards a post-2012 outcome.
Copenhagen Accord drafted at COP15 in Copenhagen.
Countries later submitted emissions reductions pledges
or mitigation action pledges, all non-binding.
Cancun Agreements drafted and largely accepted by
the COP, at COP16.
The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action drafted and
accepted by the COP, at COP17.
The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol adopted.
Key decisions adopted at COP19 include decisions on
further advancing the Durban Platform, the Green
Climate Fund and Long-Term Finance, the Warsaw
Framework for REDD Plus, and
the Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.
COP20 witnessed new pledges for the Green Climate
Fund as well as the 'multilateral assessment' of
emission-cutting efforts by developed countries."
COP21 with the goal of finalizing a global, binding
climate treaty.
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D. The Promise of Paris
At no time in the six years since the build up to the
Copenhagen meeting in 2009 have international expectations been so
high for a binding climate deal "with legal force" detailing the rights
and responsibilities for developed and developing nations alike.1 1' In
support of pledges made at COP19 in Warsaw, individual and small
groups of nations have already begun announcing GHG reduction
pledges to help build momentum. The first and most significant of
these was the US-China climate pact, comprising the G2 leading
economic powers and polluters (China was responsible for 28 percent
of global GHG emissions, while the United States was responsible for
14.5 percent, as of March 2015).112 The new joint US targets are "to
cut net greenhouse gas emissions 26[-]28 percent below 2005 levels by
2025[,]" while China has pledged to hit peak "C02 emissions around
2030, with the intention to try to peak early, and to increase the nonfossil fuel share of all energy to around 20 percent by
2030.111 3 Subsequently, China announced, in partnership with
France, that it was upping the ante still further by offering "to reduce
its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60[-]65% by 2030,
from 2005 levels" along with getting 20 percent of its energy from
renewable sources also by 2030.114 Russia is also committed to a
25 to 30 percent reduction in its GHG emissions below 1990 levels by
2030 (though if the carbon-absorbing capacity of its forests are taken
into account, that figure could climb to as high as 75 percent). 115 The
European Union has similarly pledged to reduce emissions 40 percent
below 1990 levels by 2030, a figure that Norway is matching, while
111.
See, e.g., Elliot Diringer, The Core Issues in the Paris Climate Talks, CTR. CLIMATE
& ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.c2es.org/blog/diringere/core-issues-parisclimate-talks [https://perma.cc/DFX7-3TGJ]; Nell Greenfieldboyce, U.N. Holds Climate Talks in
New
York
Ahead of Paris Meeting, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO
(June 29,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/06/29/418641168/u-n-holds-climate-talks-in-new-york-ahead-of-parismeeting?sc= 17&f=2&utm source=iosnewsapp&utm-medium=Email&utmcampaign=app
[https://perma.cc/66XP-3Z9Y].
112.
Jeff Tollefson, UN Gets First Pledges on Road to Paris Climate Talks, NATURE (Mar.
2015),
http://www.nature.com/news/un-gets-first-pledges-on-road-to-paris-climate-talks31,
1.17247 [https://perma.cc/8K3X-QZ3K] (noting that "[t]he United States officially pledged on 31
March to reduce its greenhouse-gas emissions to 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025,
meeting the United Nations' recommended deadline for submissions"); Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts,
supra note 93.
113.
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Joint
Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation (Nov. 11, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/1 1/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcementclimate-change-and-clean-energy -c [https://perma.cc/AY3M-X6WR].
114.
See Helen Briggs, China Climate Plan Unveiled, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2015),
http://www.bbc.con/news/science -environment- 33317451 [https://perma.cc/EEX9-Y2PJ].
115.
Tollefson, supra note 112.
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Switzerland has pledged a 50 percent reduction. Emerging markets
are also acting, with Mexico pledging to hit its peak carbon emissions
by 2026. Developed-developing nation blocks have also made joint
pledges, demonstrating that a new era of North-South partnership
may be dawning. The United States and Brazil, for example, have
jointly pledged to attain 20 percent of their power from renewable
sources by 2030, which represents a tripling by the United States and
a doubling for Brazil from 2015 levels. 116 In total, more than a dozen
nations and the European Union have made climate pledges as of July
117
2015, with many more to come.
As impressive as these pledges are, Climate Action Tracker, a
Berlin-based consortium of researchers that tracks national
commitments, has stated that "[i]f all pending submissions receive a
similar rank, the world will [still] be on track to breach the 2 'C
target."1 18 Indeed, as of this writing much remains to be done to
secure a climate deal with "teeth" given that myriad issues are replete
in the eighty-five pages of the draft agreement from enforcement to
finance. 11 9 These questions may be broken down into six main
categories: (1) differentiation-defining common but differentiated
responsibilities; (2) finance-examining which public and private
sources will contribute the $100 billion Green Climate Fund; (3)
adaptation-considering what is the best way to help especially less
developed nations adapt to a changing climate; (4) legal
character-considering what will "legal force" mean; procedural
requirements or formal emissions pledges; (5) transparency, such as a
single, universal framework for reporting and reviewing national
climate change efforts; and (6) ambition-if we cannot hit a two
degrees Celsius limit, determining how can we best incentivize parties
12 0
to come back to the table to up their commitments.
Yet hope remains-after all, having the United States, China,
and the European Union on board comprises more than 50 percent of
global emissions.1 21 And this hope came to fruition at COP21 with the
successful negotiation of the Paris Agreement, which is notable for at
least three facts, including that: (1) it was the product of the collective
efforts of 195 nations; (2) unlike Kyoto, it requires actions on the part
of all nations, developed and developing alike; and (3) above all, it
provides a framework for global collective action to mitigate the risk of
116.
See US and Brazil Set Energy Goals in Sign of Improving Ties, BBC NEWS (June 30,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33333795 [https://perma.cc/3D7J-MEUF].
117.
See Greenfieldboyce, supra note 111.
118.
Tollefson, supra note 112.
119.

See Greenfieldboyce, supra note 111.

120.
121.

Diringer, supra note 111.
See id.
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global climate change. 122 Perhaps of greatest importance is the fact
that the United States and China-the two largest greenhouse gas
polluters-were instrumental in achieving global consensus,
demonstrating the critical role played by minilateralism in furthering
123
multilateral ends.
This is the hope of polycentric governance. As noted by
Michael Levi of the Council on Foreign Relations, for example, in
commenting on the United States-China Climate Pact:
Supporters have wrongly obsessed with achieving a comprehensive global climate
treaty, and their opponents have gloated when attempts to negotiate such an agreement
have inevitably failed. (A corollary: Those who welcomed the U.S.-China announcement
primarily as a 4sign that a big global treaty might be possible next year are missing its
12
main point.).

Indeed, the point is that a comprehensive, global, and binding
action may or may not follow through from the Paris Agreement, but
such steps regardless constitute important progress. In other words,
the great should not be the enemy of the good. Polycentric regulation
has its faults, as is discussed in Part V, but so too does waiting
consensus that may come too late-if at all. It would be better, one
might think, to begin the process of legal clarification and norm
building now-a process strikingly similar to that underway in the
Internet governance context.
IV. THE POLYCENTRIC INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM
As with the climate, Internet governance is fracturing, which
makes addressing cybersecurity challenges more difficult. 125 Early
theorists viewed cyberspace as either an "environment without
borders and free from state control," 126 or a space where regulation is

122.
See Davenport, supra note 59.
123.
William Mauldin & Colleen McCain Nelson, Obama, Xi Advance Climate Deal,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2015, at A10 ("The U.S. pledged last year to reduce carbon-dioxide
emissions by between 26% and 28% by 2025, compared with 2005 levels, while China said it
would make sure its emissions peak by 2030 or earlier.").
124.
Michael Levi, The Obama-China Climate Deal Can't Save the World. So What?,
WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/11/21/theobama-china-climate-deal-cant-save-the-world-so-what/ [https://perma.cc/XED8-LFJE].
125.
See JONAH FORCE HILL, INTERNET FRAGMENTATION: HIGHLIGHTING THE MAJOR
TECHNICAL, GOVERNANCE AND DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS 31 (2012),
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/internet-fragmentation-jonah-hill.pdf [https://perma.cc/

VHU3-U3Q8].
126.
MURRAY, supra note 76, at 250; see David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and
Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370-72 (1996) (noting that
cyberspace, unlike physical space, does not lend itself to "territorially defined rules").
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possible. 127
This conceptualization may be compared to the
atmosphere, wherein debates still rage over delineations between
128
national and international airspace under the Chicago Convention,
considerations of the atmosphere as the "common concern of mankind"
under the Convention on Biological Diversity, 129 and where airspace
ends and the space law regime begins. 130 More recent scholarship has
recognized the complexity inherent in cyber regulation and the
necessity of a dynamic model of Internet governance.1 3 1
As a
prerequisite to analyzing whether polycentric governance can promote
a global culture of cybersecurity, this Part begins by offering a brief
analysis of the evolution of Internet governance juxtaposed against
the climate regime. Particular attention is paid to the forces of
technological advancement, resource scarcity, and politics as applied
to the formation and evolution of the Internet address and
communications systems.
A. A (Very) Brief History of Internet Governance
The story of Internet governance may be broken down into at
least three phases, during each of which the three identified
variables-technology, scarcity, and multipolar politics-played a
significant part in shaping the evolution of the Internet. 132 Phase One
127.
See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501, 502, 533 (1999) ("I have argued that cyberspace is not inherently unregulable; that
its [r]egulability is a function of its design.").
128.
Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 89, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
129.
BASLAR, supra note 20, at 360 (noting that the reason that the phrase "common
concern of mankind" was used instead in the 1988 UN General Assembly Declaration was to
avoid the politically treacherous debate over full implementation of the CHM); IUCN
Commission of Environmental Law, Draft Covenant on Environmental Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Natural Resources, 87th PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 519 (1993); A. Boyle,
International Law and the Protection of the Global Atmosphere, in D. FREESTONE AND R.
CHURCHILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 1-3 (1992).
130.
These outer space agreements include: the 1975 Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched Into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force Sept. 15,
1976) [hereinafter Registration Convention]; The 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept. 1,
1972) [hereinafter Liability Convention]; The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter OST].
131.
See MURRAY, supra note 76, at xii, 250.
132.
For more in-depth discussion on the history of Internet governance through a
polycentric lens, see Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyber Attacks through
Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1273 (2013); Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N.
Craig, Beyond the New 'Digital Divide'- Analyzing the Evolving Role of Governments in Internet
Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. IN'L L. 119, 121-44 (2014); Shackelford,
supra note 30, at 49-52.
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spanned from roughly 1969 to the birth of ICANN in 1998 and
encompassed cutting-edge work by network engineers and the ad hoc
organizations that they developed, such as the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF).13 3 Phase Two coincided with the commercial
success of the Internet and the rise of ICANN and other organizations
seeking to address the first global "digital divide" represented by the
divergence of information and communication technology resources
between developed and developing nations, culminating with the
creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in 2006.134 Finally,
Phase Three has been defined to date by the extent to which nations
have begun to assert a greater role in Internet governance with the
rise of multipolar politics and, correspondingly, polycentric
governance, potentially causing a "new 'digital divide"' to emerge not
between the "haves and have-nots," but between "the open and the
closed." 13 5 This Section explores these phases, which are summarized
in Figure 3, before discussing the implications on addressing the
global collective action problem of cyber attacks.
Technological advancement and a scarcity of formalized
governance structures helped to catalyze innovation during Phase One
of Internet governance that helped, in turn, give birth to the Internet
as we know it today. The technological heart of the Internet is packet
switching, which consists of transmitting information between linked
computers and lays the groundwork for networking. Early in the
predawn of the Information Age, routes between computers were
frequently jammed. So engineers allowed messages to be divided into
many smaller "packets" and sent along multiple paths to a
destination, resulting in our ability to move information being
multiplied by millions of times over.1 3 6 Many networks, such as the
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), the
International
Telecommunication
Union's
Open
Systems
Interconnection (OSI),137 and eventually the Tranmission Control

133.
The IETF continues to function as the leading Internet standards body today, and it
has a reputation for being an open, relatively flat organization, adopting ideas when justified by
results instead of according to rank. See KATHY BOWREY, LAW AND INTERNET CULTURES 56

(2005).
134.
135.

See Shackelford & Craig, supra note 132, at 129-43.
Larry Downes, Requiem for Failed UN Telecom Treaty: No One Mourns the WCIT,

FORBES (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2012/12/17/no-one- mourns -the-

wcit/ [https://perma.cc/U3CU-QWBF].
136.
For a detailed discussion of early Internet history, see KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW
LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996); Brief History of the
Internet, INTERNET

SOC Y,

www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml

[https://perma.cc/58R2-

R33J].
137.

See DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF

CYBERSPACE 140 (2009) (noting that as late as the early 1990s, OSI networks practically were
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Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) itself, were created throughout the
1970s

and

1980s by adapting

this packet-switching

technology.

TCP/IP boasted the efficiency, interoperability, and flexibility to
permit diverse networks to talk to one another-giving rise to many

security implications, as we will see-becoming the Internet. 138 By the
early 1990s, all the ingredients were in place for explosive growth
thanks to these technological advancements: a robust and open
network, a free and user-friendly protocol in the form of TCP/IP, and
an increase in the number of personal computers underscoring strong
demand. 139 The amount of servers grew quickly, from one based out of
the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in 1990 to more than 250 in
1993. After a series of technical milestones, by 1995, the "World Wide
Web" became equated with the Internet, boasting more than 73,500
14 1
servers. 140 You can now order a pizza online.

Throughout Phase One, though, governance remained largely
ad hoc and composed mostly of graduate students waiting for
authority figures to show up.1 4 2 The thing is, they never really did-at
least not until 1998.
Instead, an array of organic, technical
organizations like the IETF emerged to handle communications
systems as well as what was to become known as the Domain Name
System (DNS), which matches IP addresses with website names. 143 In
many ways, science and technical innovation became the currency of
public diplomacy online, much as it long has been in other areas of the
global commons, such as the Poles.1 44 This development is one reason
why IETF has continued to enjoy more legitimacy in certain circles
"the Internet"; in fact, until 1994, much of the US government used OSI); MURRAY, supra note
76, at 68-69; John R. Aschenbrenner, Open Systems Interconnection,25(3) IBM SYS. J. 369, 369
(1986). For background on the history of ARPANET, see History, COMPUT. HISTORY MUSEUM,
http://www.computerhistory.org/internet-history/ [https:/Hperma.cc/F8KS-M95L].
138.
See MURRAY, supra note 76, at 61 (arguing that the Advanced Research Projects
Agency was created by President Eisenhower to maintain US technological superiority over the
Soviet Union).
139.
See id. at 72.
140.
See Robert Cailliau, Speech Delivered at the Launching of European Branch of the
W3 Consortium (Nov. 2, 1995), http://www.netvalley.com/archives/mirrors/robertcailliau_
speech.htm [https://perma.cc/DGK7-F5AZ].
141.
See Pizza Hut Tells Twitter It Made the First Online Sale in 1994, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/09/pizza-hut-n_3894981.html
[https://perma.cc/2PYS-DWQA].
142.
See, e.g., Hans Klein, ICANN and Internet Governance: Leveraging Technical
Coordination To Realize Global Public Policy, 18 INFO. SOC'Y 193, 198 (2002); see JOYCE
REYNOLDS & JON POSTEL, NETWORK WORKING GROUP, IETF RFC 1000, (1987), http://www.rfceditor.org/rfc/rfc1000.txt [https:H/perma.cc/3ZUE-ZN5U].
143.
See MURRAY, supra note 76, at 98.
144.
Paul A. Berkman & Oran R. Young, Governance and Environmental Change in the
Arctic Ocean, 324 SCI. 17 (2009) (arguing that successful science diplomacy requires
"knowledge-sharing and the steady generation of scientific findings").
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than other more top-down organizations, such as ICANN. 145 Neither
politics nor scarcity played significant roles during Phase One,
especially once TCP/IP was widely implemented. That was to change
in the 1990s during the "DNS Wars" when the US government struck
back.
On January 28, 1998, Jon Postel, whom techies call the "God"
of the Internet, 146 decided to perform a "test," though others called it a
"hijacking. ' 147 Long entrusted with the root file of the Domain Name
System, Postel decided to redirect queries from the authoritative root
server to a second server-his computer at the University of Southern
Few people noticed, but Postel could have
California (USC).
eliminated "dot-com" for much of the world with just a few
keystrokes. 148 His test was reversed in a matter of days as an irate
Ira Magaziner, then-President Clinton's Senior Science Advisor, called
Postel and said that both he and USC would be liable if he continued
compromising the root. 149 But the episode served to further inflame
the "DNS Wars," during which an array of private companies,
nonprofits, individuals, governments, and civil society organizations
emerged to vie for a stake in Internet governance. 150 Nonprofits like
the Internet Society (ISOC), an umbrella organization focused on
and policies, consulted with foreign
Internet technologies

145.
See MURRAY, supra note 76, at 107 (commenting that ICANN was created by the
United States "artificially"). However, even though the US government decided to form ICANN,
there was a period of open discussion regarding what form the new organization should take.
Indeed, one criticism is that ICANN incorporates too many democratic mechanisms in its
decision-making. See Philip Corwin, The ICANN Policy and Decision Making Process Is Seriously
Flawed, INTERNET COMMERCE ASS'N. (Aug. 15, 2012), http://internetcommerce.orgfRegistrationAbuseTime to-Fish or Cut Bait [https://perma.cc/F6LZ-QN5C] (arguing that the extended
duration of deliberation results in a lengthy process without yielding concrete action). Thus, it is
too simplistic to state, for example, that the IETF is a bottom-up organization while ICANN
utilizes top-down management processes. Rather, given that ICANN does have some limited
enforcement authority to make decisions and that it is a non-profit representing multiple
stakeholders but with authority ultimately vested in the US Department of Commerce, it is more
accurate to consider a continuum with IETF at one end, and ICANN near the center. The other
extreme of the governance spectrum may be considered a more state-centric, top-down model
favored by some nations, such as Russia and China. See, e.g., Eilery Roberts Biddle & Emma
Llans6, WCIT Watch Day 11: We Cannot Compromise on the Internet, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECH. (Dec. 13, 2012), https://cdt.org/blog/wcit-watch-day-11-we-cannot-compromise-on-theinternet/ [https://perma.cc/9NQ4-LNQM] (describing the frustration of some countries with the
ITU's decision-making approach).
146.
Sci/Tech 'God of the Internet' is Dead, BBC NEWS (Oct. 19, 1998, 12:30 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.ukI2/hi/science/nature/196487.stm [https://perma.cc/EG7S-CHAB].
LAURA LAMBERT, THE INTERNET: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 200-02 (2005).
147.
148.

JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A

BORDERLESS WORLD 45 (2006).
149.
Id. at 46.
See Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name
150.
System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 158 (2000).
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governments, which were questioning their exclusion from decision151
making in this newly global network.
Phase Two also coincided with the United States' unipolar
moment. While it listened to the concerns of numerous public- and
private-sector stakeholders, the US government elected to keep
control of the root and license it to ICANN through the US
Department of Commerce. 152 Ultimately, this role was taken over by
the Federal Communications Commission in 2015.153 Problems of
scarcity also began to emerge in this era, evidenced by a growing
pattern of "cyber squatting," or occupying a known trademark in the
1 54
hope of selling it back to the rightful owner for a profit later.
ICANN has played a significant role in mitigating issues of cyber
squatting, such as by setting up an independent alternative dispute
155
resolution system.
Figure 2: Internet Governance Timeline from the Virtual
156
Policy Network.
Year

Organization

1865

International
Telecommunication

Description
The International Telegraph
Union was formed in Paris. Now
the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU),
it is currently a special agency of
the United Nations.

151.
See MURRAY, supra note 76, at 89, 91 (noting that the main goal of ISOC is to host
and support standards- making bodies, such as IETF).
152.
Markus Mifller, Who Owns the Internet? Ownership as a Legal Basis for American
Control of the Internet, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 709, 717 (2005) ('This
gives the United States the capacity to threaten a country with the prospect of taking away its
country-code TLD."); see also Phillip Corwin, The ICANN-U.S. AOC: What It Really Means,
INTERNET COMMERCE ASS'N. (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.internetcommerce.org/ICANN-U.S._AOC
[https:/Hperma.cc/3ACT-LC4L] (discussing the changes in oversight wrought by the 2009 AOC).
153.
See, e.g., Fred Campbell, ICANN, Meet Your New Master, the FCC,RED ST. (Apr. 3,
2015),
http://www.redstate.com/diary/fredcampbell/215/4/3/icann-meet-new-master-fcc/
[https://perma.cc/XP4N-NT8M].
154.
See, e.g., Oliver R. Gutierrez, Get Off My URL: Congress Outlaws Cybersquattingin
the Wild West of the Internet, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 142-43 (2001).

155.
BOWREY, supra note 132, at 51 (discussing ICANN's trademark dispute resolution
policy).
156.
Internet Governance: A Brief Timeline, VIRTUAL POLICY NETWORK (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://www.virtualpolicy.net/internet-governance-a-brief-timeline.html
[https://perma.cc/H2VFHXCU].
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Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority

685

The Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) emerged from
the early history of the Internet
through the efforts of pioneers,
including Postel.
* There is no agreed upon "start
date" for IANA, in part because of
the informality of the
organization. Dates range from
the 1970s to the 1990s.

1986

Internet
Engineering Task
Force

The IETF develops and promotes
technical standards for the
Internet. In 1992, the IETF
became part of the Internet
Society.

1992

Internet Society

The Internet Society was formed
in 1992 to further technical
standards for the Internet and to
promote its use.

tCorporation
Names
Internet
and Numbers

2003

First Word Summit
on the Information
Society

2005

Second World
Summit on the
Information Society

The Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) was created in 1998 as a
not-for-profit organization that
took on elements of Internet
governance from IANA.
Created the Working Group on
Internet Governance (WGIG) to
look deeper into the issues of
Internet Governance and prepare
a report for the second phase of
the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS).
The second WSIS meeting
established both an agreed
commitment and agenda for the
development of Internet
governance. The documents also
established the Internet
Governance Forum.
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Renewal of ICANN's contract with
the US government.

creation of IGF

World Conference on
International
Telecommunications

2014

2015

NETmundial and
ITU Plenipotentiary
Conference 2014
(PP-14).
Tenth World
Summit on
Information
Systems (WSIS-10).

ITU convened the World
Conference on International
Telecommunications (WCIT) in
December 2012.
NETmundial was hosted by the
Brazilian government and cosponsored by ICANN; PP-14 was
convened by the ITU in September
2014.
WSIS-10 was held in New York in
December 2015 that, among other
things, underscored the
desirability of multi-stakeholder
Internet governance and the
importance of promoting human
157
rights online.

Phase Three may be considered a reaction to the unfinished
business of Phase Two with efforts underway to formalize a global
system of Internet governance lead predominantly by nations, address
latent cyber insecurity, and find common ground to ward off a 'new
digital divide." 158 Yet as with the waning influence of the United
States over climate negotiations from Kyoto to Copenhagen, so too has
the new multipolar status quo made itself increasingly felt. This
influence manifested in 2006 with the creation of the IGF, which was
intended to be "a new forum for multi-stakeholder dialogue ...

an

interactive, collaborative space where all stakeholders can air their
views and exchange ideas." 159 However, the IGF remains little more

157.
See, e.g., Stefaan G. Verhulst, Toward WSIS 3.0. Adopting Next-Gen Governance
Solutions for Tomorrow's Information Society, CIRCLE ID (Jan. 4, 2016, 1:19 PM),
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20160104_toward wsis 8 adoptingnext-gen-governance-solution
s/ [https://perma.cc/K9N9-726W].
158.
Downes, supra note 135.
159.
Background of IGF, INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM, http://www.intgovforum.org/
cms/aboutigf [https://perma.cc/NKS8-U8HG].
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than a "toothless talk shop,"' 160 highlighting the continued strength of
the US position in Internet governance, though the United States
faced its biggest challenge to date in late 2012.
The so-called "Rise of the Rest" was felt most prominently in
Conference
on
International
the
ITU's
2012
World
Telecommunications (WCIT) when the 193 ITU member states
the
International
revising
and
considered
reviewed
Telecommunication Regulations, which were last negotiated in 1988
and "facilitate international interconnection and [the] interoperability
As with the
"161
of information and communication services ....
UNFCCC annual COP gatherings, the difficulties of reaching
consensus in a divided world replete with emerging power centers
were on display. Here, nations identifying either with "Internet
to
designations
came
sovereignty" or "Internet freedom"
loggerheads. 16 2 The US government has opposed a larger Internet
governance role for foreign nations or the ITU,1 6 3 but authoritarian
regimes lobbied UN member states to vote their way. 164 Ultimately
eighty-nine countries signed the WCIT final resolution that, on the
one hand, embraces multi-stakeholder governance, but, on the other,
determines that "all governments should have an equal role and
responsibility for international Internet governance and for ensuring
the stability, security and continuity of the existing Internet . . . ."165
160.
Khadija Patel, Internet Governing Rights: World Powers Butt Heads, DAILY
MAVERICK (Dec. 5, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012 -12 -05-internetgoverning-rights-world-powers-butt-heads/#.UYF1MbXqmn8 [https://perma.cc/NRE2-SJRN].
The Rise of the Rest, supra note 53; see e.g., World Conference on International
161.
ITU,
http://www.itu.int/enwcit- 12/Pages/default.aspx
Telecommunications
(WCIT-12),
[https://perma.cc/ZTX7-8BBA]; see ITU, FINAL ACTS OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON
(2012)
[hereinafter
ITU
RESOLUTIONS],
INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
http://www.itu.int/en/wcit- 12/Documents/final-acts-wcit- 12.pdf [https://perma.cc/BPM7-U5XR].
The term "Internet sovereignty" as used here refers to the growing state-centric
162.
approach to both Internet governance and cybersecurity. For one iteration of the Chinese
perspective on this topic, see White PaperExplains 'Internet Sovereignty,' PEOPLE'S DAILY (June
9, 2010), http://en.peopledaily.com.cn/90001190776/90785/7018630.html [https://perma.cA738R5WM] (defining Internet sovereignty in terms of requiring "foreign IT companies operating in
China ... [to] abide by China's laws and [be] subject to Beijing's oversight"). For a discussion of
Internet freedom, see Defining the Cyber Threat in Internet Governance, in SHACKELFORD, supra
note 31; see also Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom
2010),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm
(Jan.
21,
[https://perma.cc/NF3F-YSET] (emphasizing the need for behavioral norms and respect among
states to encourage the free flow of information and protect against cyber attacks).
163.
See, e.g., Leo Kelion, US Resists Control of Internet Passing to UN Agency, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uklnews/technology-19106420 [https:/Hperma.cc/5UXM6G4P].
See id. (voicing the ITU's opposition to voting and affirming that any changes to the
164.
Internal Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) must have unanimous support).
Resolution Plen/3 (Dubai2012): To Fosteran Enabling Environment for the Greater
165.
Growth of the Internet, in

FINAL ACTS OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
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This language only appears in a non-binding resolution entitled
"Fostering an Enabling Environment for the Internet," but it has been
seized on by some commentators as heralding a growing state-centric
view of cyberspace held by many nations, especially in Asia (with the
166
notable exceptions of India and Japan), Australia, and Africa.
However, developments since 2012 seem to set the stage for a
continuation of the multi-stakeholder status quo for the foreseeable
future with back-to-back "wins" for the US-endorsed multistakeholder approach at NETmundial in Brazil and the ITU's latest
gathering as of this writing, PP-14 in South Korea. Russian plans to
allow the ITU to allocate IP addresses, Arab proposals to strengthen
the ITU's role in shaping international online surveillance law and
policy, and Brazilian efforts to allow the ITU to address privacy
largely went nowhere or were watered down to such an extent that
their practical impact is minimal. 16 7 Yet from Postel to the present,
the continuation of our fractured system of governance has
contributed to a proliferation in cyber insecurity. This issue requires
an investigation of polycentric governance to see whether and how
such a framework can help mitigate this global collective action
problem.
B. Applying Polycentric Governance to Cybersecurity
Professor Ostrom and other scholars have argued for the
adoption of polycentric management solutions to collective action
problems stemming from the global commons in situations where the
international community is either unable or unwilling to take
necessary action. 168 The basic notion in this context is that "a single
governmental unit" may be incapable of managing "global collective
action problems" due in part to free riders discouraging "trust and
reciprocity" between stakeholders. 169 Nations that are not bound by
legal commitments, in other words, enjoy the benefits of other nations'
sacrifices without realizing the costs; solutions "negotiated at a global
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
20
(2012),
http://www.itu.int/en/wcit- 12fPages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/EG9C-XGE3] [hereinafter ITU Resolution].
166.
See
WTIT-12
Final
Acts
Signatories,
ITU
(Dec.
14,
2012),
http://www.itu.int/osg/wcit- 12/highlights/signatories.html
[https://perma.cc/62ZU-WMRC]
[hereinafter ITU Signatories].
167.
See Samantha Dickinson, How Will Internet Governance Change After the ITU
Conference?, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2014, 10:24 PM), http://www.theguardian.coml
technology/20 14/nov/07/how-will-internet-governance-change -after-the-itu-conference
[https://perma.cc/NK6C-8K8Q].
168.
See Ostrom, supra note 5, at 3-4, 32.
169.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 27, at 9 (discussing the feasibility of managing
diverse problems within the climate change context with diverse institutions).
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level, if not backed by a variety of efforts at national, regional, and
local levels ... are not guaranteed to work well." 170 Those actors
advocating for a polycentric approach argue that instead of the
creation of a centralized artificial organization in the vein of ICANN,
local institutions relying to the extent possible on organic selforganization, such as IETF, should be created to promote trust and
bottom-up governance. 171 Such a polycentric approach would enjoy
active oversight at multiple scales and from diverse stakeholders,
though it does have its drawbacks as explored in Part V.
As applied to cybersecurity, such a polycentric approach affords
a rich array of lessons on best practices ranging from addressing
technical vulnerabilities to how best to leverage the power of the
private sector to promote cyber peace.1 72
To summarize, the
importance of "smaller-scale effects" and local actors-be they
technical communities, individual firms, or even nations-should be
recognized within a polycentric framework. 173 As discussed above, the
range of entities now active in cyberspace demonstrates the extent to
which governance is fragmenting. Polycentric governance can help
conceptualize such a dynamic system, given its embrace of multistakeholder governance, norms, bottom-up regulation, and targeted
74
measures to enhance cybersecurity in the face of multipolar politics. 1
Regulation is happening at various levels and through various
modalities, including laws, norms, markets, code,1 75 self-regulation,
and multilateral collaboration, all of which can contribute to
enhancing global cybersecurity. Each of these regulatory approaches
has unique benefits and drawbacks, but together they contribute to a
governance regime that is multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-type, and
multi-sectoral in scope 176 and that complements the top-down
governance model favored by certain nations. 177 To more fully
comprehend the benefits and drawbacks of such an approach along
with what lessons the field of atmospheric governance may hold for
Internet governance, this Article next turns to unpacking the
literature on polycentric governance more fully and to applying it to
170.
171.
172.
173.

Ostrom, supra note 5, at 4.
Id. at 4-5, 35.
For a deep dive into such an approach, see generally SHACKELFORD, supra note 31.
See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity

of Organizations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS: ANALYTICAL AND POLITICAL
CHALLENGES INVOLVING A DIVERSITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 105, 117 (Eric Brousseau et al. eds.,

2012) (noting that polycentric systems frequently enjoyed better outcomes than those of central
governments).
174.
See McGinnis, supra note 22, at 171-72.
175.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 125 (2006).
176.
McGinnis, supra note 22, at 170-72.
177.
See ITU Signatories, supra note 166.
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both the global collective action problems of climate change and cyber
attacks.

V. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND CYBER ATTACKS THROUGH
POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE

This Part assesses the potential and pitfalls of relying on a
polycentric approach to mitigating the dual global collective action
problems of climate change and cyber attacks. The analysis begins
with a note on the study of regimes before moving on to applying
Professor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) and
Social-Ecological Systems (SES) frameworks to the topics of
atmospheric and Internet governance.
The study concludes by
couching
the discussion within the broader literature
on
social-ecological systems and an investigation of comparative regime
effectiveness in the global commons.
A. A Note on the Study of Regimes
The ability to craft regimes is at the heart of our capacity to
address global collective action problems; however, what exactly are
regimes, and what regime types might be most amenable to
addressing the dual challenges of climate change and cyber attacks in
particular? According to Professor Oran Young, "Regimes are social
institutions governing the actions of those involved ... they are
practices consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of
rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these
roles. ' 178 In other words, regimes may be considered as rule-based
179
governance systems that "constrain [the] policy options" of actors
18 0
while also creating rights for users.
International regimes are created and shaped by the tides of
domestic politics, 18 1 yet scientific uncertainty and advancing
technology also play important roles, as discussed throughout this
study.18 2 In contrast to comprehensive regimes such as the World

178.
ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATIONAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 12-13 (1989). For more on this topic, see Who Controls
Cyberspace? Analyzing Cyber Regulation Through Polycentric Governance, in SHACKELFORD,

supra note 31; Prenkert & Shackelford, supra note 25 (representing the first publication of
portions of this analysis).
179.

See SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 30 (1998).

180.
181.

See id.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 27, at 16.

182.

See BUCK, supra note 179, at 7.
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Trade Organization (WTO), so-called regime complexes are created
when several different regimes "coexist in the same issue area without
clear hierarchy," which can be caused by different and continuously
evolving political coalitions.1 8 3
Given the multipolar state of
international relations, "loosely coupled" regime complexes enjoy
advantages over unitary regimes such as some UN consensus-driven
multilateral treaties. 184 Building institutions is costly-in terms of
time, resources, and political capital. Thus, leaders who invest in such
efforts often find it easier to work in smaller "clubs," such as the
Conference of Mayors or the Major Emitters Forum, comprised of the
largest greenhouse gas emitters,1 8 5 rather than through forums with
universal membership like the UNFCCC.18 6
Comprehensive regimes are most common when the interests
of powerful actors are aligned "across a broad issue area."1 8 7 Such a
level of agreement and cooperation is rare in the international
community, particularly in an era increasingly defined by multipolar
politics replete with divisive issues that touch on core national
security interests.18 8 This has led to a greater emphasis on targeted,
issue-specific regimes that are discussed next in the context of the TAD
Framework.
B. Applying the LAD Framework to Mitigate Global Collective Action
Problems
Beginning in the early 1990s with her groundbreaking book
Governing the Commons, Professor Ostrom created an informative
framework of eight design principles for the management of common
pool resources known as the LAD Framework.18 9 These principles
include the importance of: (1) "clearly defined boundaries for the user
pool . . . and the resource domain";1 90 (2) "proportional equivalence
between benefits and costs";191 (3) "collective choice arrangements"

See Keohane & Victor, supra note 27, at 2, 4.
184.
Id. at 2.
185.
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, U.S. DEVT OF STATE (2011),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/O9/172527.htm
[https://perma.cc/3PWE-56R6]; see e.g.,
Keohane & Victor, supra note 27, at 9-11.
186.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 27, at 9-10.
187.
Id. at 4.
188.
See Abraham M. Denmark, Managing the Global Commons, WASH. Q., July 2010, at
165, 167 (discussing challenges to US unilateral dominance of global commons governance).
189.
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
183.

FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 90 (1990).

190.
191.

BuCK, supra note 179, at 32.
See OSTROM, supra note 189, at 90.
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ensuring "that the resource users participate in setting ... rules"; 192
193
(4) "monitoring . . . by the appropriators or by their agents";

(5) "graduated sanctions" for rule violators;19 4 (6) "conflict-resolution
195
mechanisms [that] are readily available, low cost, and legitimate";
(7) "minimal recognition of rights to organize"; 196 and (8) "governance
activities

[being]

.

.

.

organized

in

multiple

layers

of nested

enterprises."' 197 Not all of Professor Ostrom's design principles are
applicable in either the context of climate change or cyber attacks,
given that they were designed primarily for managing small-scale
common pool resources, such as forests and lakes. However, most of
Professor Ostrom's principles are still salient and are addressed in
turn to inform a discussion of appropriate policy responses to global
collective action problems.
1. Defined Boundaries
According to Professor Ostrom, "The boundary rules relate to
who can enter, harvest, manage, and potentially exclude others'
impacts.
Participants then have more assurance
about
trustworthiness and cooperation of the others involved."19 8 However,
applying this element of the IAD Framework to both atmospheric and
Internet governance presents challenges. In the climate context, one
of the most divisive and ongoing issues is how to exclude actors from
the atmospheric commons by limiting their ability to pollute. There
has been some progress on this question of defining common but
differentiated responsibilities in the UNFCCC-led climate change
20 0
negotiations, 199 as seen in the 2015 Paris Agreement.
As with the atmosphere, boundaries in cyberspace can also be
difficult to draw, though they are created both through legal
mechanisms, such as enclosure and the Internet sovereignty
192.
193.

BUCK, supra note 179, at 32.
Id.

194.

Id.

195.
Id.
196.
Ostrom, supra note 173, at 118 tbl. 5.3.
197.
Id.
198.
Id. at 119.
199.
See Pieter Pauw et al., Different Perspectives on Differentiated Responsibilities:A
State-of-the-Art Review of the Notion of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in
InternationalNegotiations tbls. 12 (German Dev. Inst. Discussion Paper, 2014), https://www.diegdi.de/uploads/media/DP_6.2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/66T3-B5RF].
200.
See Davenport, supra note 59 (noting that while "the individual countries' plans are
voluntary,... the legal requirements that they publicly monitor, verify and report what they are
doing, as well as publicly put forth updated plans, are designed to create a 'name-and-shame'
system of global peer pressure, in hopes that countries will not want to be seen as international
laggards").
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movement discussed above, 20 1 and organically, such as through the
creation of micro communities. 20 2 This element of the IAD Framework
also engages with the prevailing question of whether cyberspace is in
fact a commons, or whether its physical infrastructure-the hardware
from routers to fiber optic cables that comprise the "tubes" of the
20 4
Internet 203-make it a different kind of "new commons" entirely.
2. Proportionality
Proportionality underscores the need for equity in a system so
that some of the "users [do not] get all the benefits and pay few of the
205 This principle evokes debate over the core question
costs ... 2.
about how to best enhance equity in the atmospheric commons, such
as through some application of the CHM concept to help ensure that
developing nations maintain access to the atmosphere through
pollution credits, allowing them to better meet the basic needs of their
populations. Likewise, proportionality in the atmospheric commons
would be hurt if a final accord was perceived to permit one
population-be it a developed or developing nation-to pay lower costs
relative to the other while receiving greater benefits over some time
horizon. 20 6 This issue raises the specter of balancing equity with what
is politically possible, both through the UNFCCC and as a matter of
domestic politics when it comes time to ratify the final accord.
Proportionality also emphasizes why the creation of a level playing
field for firms is so important in the cybersecurity context whereby
some businesses do not bear the costs for others' omissions. This fact
could play out in the critical infrastructure context; some businesses,
such as insurance companies, may be at greater risk of a cyber attack.
The electrical grid is also a particular concern: if the electrical grid
20 7
was targeted, it could result in losses of up to $1 trillion.

201.
See infra Part IV.
202.
See MURRAY, supra note 76, at 164 (explaining how members of micro-communities
tend to focus only on what directly impacts their own activities).
203.
See, e.g., ANDREW BLUM, TUBES: A JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE INTERNET 1
(2013); Hacking the Internet, the Dalai Lama, and You: Managing Technical Vulnerabilities in
the Internet, in SHACKELFORD, supra note 31.

204.
Charlotte Hess, Mapping the New Commons 1 (July 1418, 2008) (Unpublished
paper presented at the Twelfth Biennial Conf. of the Int'l Ass'n for the Study of the Commons,
Cheltenbaum, U.K.).
Ostrom, supra note 173, at 120.
205.
206.
Id.
See LLOYDS & CTR. OF RISK STUDIES, UNV. OF CAMBRIDGE, BUSINESS BLACKOUT:
207.
THE INSURANCE IMPLICATIONS OF A CYBER ATTACK ON THE US POWER GRID 334 (2015).
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3. Collective-Choice Arrangements and Minimal Recognition of Rights
Professor Ostrom's third design principle states "that most of
the individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to
participate in making and modifying the rules related to boundaries,
assessment of costs, . . . etc. ' 208 This principle underscores the
importance of engaged and proactive rulemaking by technical
20 9
communities, the private sector, and the international community.
Such a multi-stakeholder approach is evident in both the
atmospheric and Internet contexts. Many thousands of NGOs and
2 10
other interested organizations participate in the UNFCCC process.
This level of involvement by civil society can breed success, as seen in
the designation of Antarctica as a world park, establishment of the
Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary, and the moratorium on high seas
drift net fishing. 211 Similarly, the history of Internet governance has
been marked by its multi-stakeholder approach to governance with an
array of private entities such as ICANN and IETF cooperating with a
range of governments and other organizations to make policy. Yet it is
also true that more remains to be done to promote engagement, such
as through a revamped IGF. Moreover, this principle recognizes the
need to modify rules as the regulatory and technological environments
change. 212 As has been seen, the cyber threat matrix is continuously
evolving, making it vital for local rules in the form of industry best
practices to proactively evolve along with cyberspace, and providing a
cautionary tale against heavy-handed government regulation. Much
of the same could be said in the climate context given the rapid rate at
which technologies are evolving and pricing structures are changing,
such as in the renewable energy context and the steep fall in price of
21 3
solar panels in recent years.

208.
Ostrom, supra note 173, at 120.
209.
See George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Law as a Source of Strategic Advantage:
Using ProactiveLaw for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 641, 656-57 (2010) (discussing
the origins of the proactive law movement, which may be considered "a future-oriented approach
to law placing an emphasis on legal knowledge to be applied before things go wrong").
210.
The engagement of civil society in UN meetings may be seen in the more than 2,500
NGOs that participated in the 1992 Rio Summit and in many of the COPs held since then. See
BUCK, supra note 179, at 8.
211.
See Siedel & Haapio, supra note 209, at 656-57.
212.
Ostrom, supra note 173, at 120.
213.
See, e.g., Giles Parkinson, Solar Costs Will Fall Another 40% in 2 Years. Here's Why,
CLEAN TECHNICA (Jan. 29, 2015), http://cleantechnica.com/2015/01/29/solar-costs-will-fall-40next-2-years-heres/ [https://perma.cc/3GPQ-S4VQ].
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4. Monitoring

According to Professor Ostrom, trust can typically only do so
much to mitigate rule-breaking behavior. 214 Eventually, some level of
monitoring becomes important.
In self-organized communities,
monitors are typically chosen among the members to ensure "the
conformance of others to local rules. ' 215 However, in the global
context, verification becomes difficult. This enforcement problem is
one of the principal issues that held up negotiators at COP15 with
some nations, including China, balking at letting inspectors monitor
their compliance with a final agreement. 21 6 Verification is similarly
difficult in the cybersecurity context with the technical knowhow and
necessary hardware being widely diffused and oftentimes capable of
dual-use purposes.
One way to promote cybersecurity is to leverage informationsharing organizations to diffuse both cyber threat data as well as best
practices. Legislation has been proposed to aid in such cyber threat
information sharing2 7 as well as create industry councils in the
United States and empower them "to develop and coordinate the
'218
enforcement of cybersecurity guidelines for key U.S. sectors.
However, as of this writing such efforts have not been codified into US
law.
5. Graduated Sanctions and Dispute Resolution
Other insights from Professor Ostrom's principles, such as the
need for graduated sanctions for rule violators and effective dispute
resolution, speak to the importance of addressing legal ambiguities
and establishing norms of behavior. The former point underscores the
significance of not "[1]etting an infraction pass unnoticed," 219 meaning
that the cost of flouting agreed-upon climate goals and cyber norms
alike need to be recognized through some combination of market
reaction and governmental action.
The latter point is a key

214.
Ostrom, supra note 173, at 120.
215.
Id. at 121.
216.
See Bryan Walsh, FrustrationMounts in Copenhagen as Talks Stall, TIME (Dec. 15,
2009),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1929071-19290701948020,00.html [https://perma.cc/TH3Z-L439].
217.
See, e.g., Sean Lyngaas, Parsing the Cyber Bills in the 114th Congress, FED.
COMPUTER WEEKLY (June 19, 2015), http://fcw.com/articles/2015/06/19/crs-cyber-bills-critread.aspx [https://perma.cc/6G9X-V5FB].
218.
Alexei Alexis, House Homeland Security Leaders Said Close To Unveiling
Cybersecurity Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 10, 2013), http://www.bna.comlhouse-homelandsecurity-n17179874424/ [https:/Hperma.cc/YV25-AWLQ].
219.
Ostrom, supra note 173, at 121.
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component of creating a functioning body of international climate and
cybersecurity law in which the rules of the road are clear for
companies, countries, and the international community alike. Some
progress has been made in the cybersecurity context, such as "the
recognition that international law applies to state activity in
cyberspace and that human rights protections that apply offline also
apply online. '220 Yet challenges remain, as may be seen by the Obama
Administration weighing how best to respond to the Office of Personal
Management breach and the Chinese government's alleged
221
involvement.
6. Nested Enterprises
As stated by Professor Ostrom, "When common-pool resources
that are being managed by a group are part of a larger set of resource
systems, an eighth design principle is usually present in robust
systems. The nested enterprise principle states that governance
activities are organized in multiple layers of related governance
regimes. '222 Such nesting can "occur either between user groups and
larger governmental jurisdictions, or between user groups themselves"
with an example being the varying components of irrigation
systems. 223
Just as this multilevel system is imperative for
environmental governance in large ecological systems with distinct
local dynamics, 224 so too is it essential for enhancing cybersecurity
given the local, national, and global impact of cyber attacks on
225
economic development and security.
7. Summary
As helpful as Professor Ostrom's IAD Framework is to
analyzing the factors necessary to create a functioning system of
polycentric governance to address a given global collective action
220.
(Apr.

Henry Farrell, Promoting Norms for Cyberspace, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
2015),

http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/promoting-norms-cyberspace/p36358?cid=nlc-

npbnews-2015_national conference confirmation and background--link22-20 1 5 060 2 &sp-mid=
48790069&sp-rid=a3plZ3VyYUBjZnIub3JnSO [https://perma.ccfVD29-PUA2].
221.
See David E. Sanger, U.S. Decides to RetaliateAgainst China'sHacking, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/world/asia/us-decides-to-retaliate-againstchinas-hacking.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9QQJ-J5GL].
222.
Ostrom, supra note 173, at 122.
223.
See Michael Cox et al., A Review of Design Principlesfor Community-Based Natural
Resource Management, 15 ECOLOGY

& SOC'Y

38 (2010),

http://www.ecologyandsociety.org

vo115/iss4/art38/main.html [https://perma.cc/J767-WT5G].
224.

Ostrom, supra note 172, at 122.

225.

For further examples of the successes and failures of polycentric governance in the

Internet governance context, see Cyber Peace, in SHACKELFORD, supra note 31.
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problem, it is far from perfect, as Professor Ostrom would be the first
to admit. 226 Insights such as boundaries being difficult to define, the
need for proportionality, a robust role for civil society, and effective
monitoring coupled with graduated sanctions only take us so far in
crafting effective regimes for both atmospheric and Internet
governance. Indeed, Professors Michael McGinnis, Dan Cole, and
Graham Epstein have analyzed the IAD Framework and have pointed
out that, among other challenges, it suffers from a lack of specification
in community attributes, an insufficient differentiation of outputs and
mediated
outcomes, and difficulties
surrounding
exogenous
variables. 227 Thus, there have lately been efforts to update and
supplement the IAD Framework by combining it with lessons from the
literature examining social-ecological systems. Those studies are
briefly addressed next in the context of the dual global collective
action problems of climate change and cyber attacks.
C. Marrying the AD Framework with the Study of Social-Ecological
Systems
Though Professor Ostrom's important work on the IAD
Framework often gets much of the attention in public policy circles,
given its emphasis on self-understanding beyond classical rational
choice rather than black letter law (that may or may not be enforced
in a particular context), 228 her work on the SES Framework offers an
even more "comprehensive approach to the study of closely-coupled
systems" drawing from both social and ecological factors. 229 Running
throughout her work is an empirical demonstration that "public
services can be most efficiently provided under a system of multiple
and overlapping jurisdictions ....-230
The SES Framework grew up as a result of the need to
distribute resources efficiently and equitably in an era increasingly
defined by scarcity, especially when considering global climate

226.
See Elinor Ostrom, et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global
Challenges, 284 SC. 282, 282 (1999) (noting that some of her work in the global commons context
to "provide starting points for addressing future challenges").
227.
See Dan Cole, Michael McGinnis, & Graham Epstein, Toward a Combined LAD-SES
Framework 5 (Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis,
Indiana Univ., Bloomington, Ind., 2013), http://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu~colloquia/materials/
papers/Cole,%20McGinnis,%2OEpstein-PowerPoint.pdf [https://perma.cc/D493-Z8KA].
228.
Michael D. McGinnis, Elinor Ostrom: Politics as Problem-Solving in Polycentric
Settings, in ELINOR OSTROM AND THE BLOOMINGTON SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 281, 285,

292 (Daniel H. Cole & Michael D. McGinnis eds., 2014).
229.
Id.
230.
Id. at 286.
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change. 23 1 In Professor Ostrom's own words, the SES Framework
helps show "the relationships among four first-level core subsystems"
including "resource systems ... resource units ... governance systems
... and users
-*"232 Each of these core subsystems is then composed
of "multiple second-level variables," which "are further composed of
deeper-level variables. ' 233 In other words, it is "complicated," 234 but so
is policymaking. Professor Ostrom's SES model is shown in Figure 3.
235
Figure 3. Ostrom's 2009 SES Framework.
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Although work on a combined IAD SES Framework continues
as of this writing, early results, including by those of Professors Dan
Cole and Michael McGinnis, show great promise. 236 A rich array of
ten new factors comprises the SES, including: (1) the size of the
resource system-with a preference for medium-scale domains (the
trick being to parse global commons arenas into this size);
(2) productivity-including the need for scarcity to drive governance
change,
highlighting
the
importance
of
this
variable;
(3) predictability-a problem given the diverse array of factors at play

231.
Id. at 294.
232.
Elinor Ostrom, A General Framework for Analyzing
Social-Ecological Systems, 325 SC. 419, 420 (2012).
233.
Id.
234.
McGinnis, supra note 228, at 294.
235.
Ostrom, supra note 232.
236.
See, e.g., Cole, McGinnis, & Epstein, supra note 227, at 9.
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in both climate
change and cybersecurity;
(4) resource
mobility-making self-organization more likely in stationary settings;
(5) the number of users-with a necessary correlation between the size
of the resource domain and user base to aid in good governance;
(6) leadership-particularly norm entrepreneurs in this context;
(7) norms; (8) knowledge about the SES-a tall order given the
complexities inherent in both atmospheric and Internet governance;
(9) importance of the SES-the stakes could not be higher to the
global community, whether people realize it or not; and
(10) collective-choice rules (bottom-up rulemaking lowers transaction
costs, among other benefits,
showing the importance
of
multi- stakeholder engagement).237 Together, parsed and updated,
these factors, combined with the IAD, hold the potential to better
inform twenty-first century global commons governance.
However, there are issues with the SES Framework as well,
including the fact that it is "[p]urely descriptive, diagnostic, and
static," as well as an "absence of economic variables" and "[d]ubious
specifications of some variables. ' 238 A combined IAD-SES Framework
promises to be more dynamic, logically structured, and includes other
factors, such as transaction costs into the model's overarching
design. 239
It also could help avoid some of the drawbacks of
polycentric governance discussed below.
D. The Politicaland Ethical Pitfalls of Polycentric Governance
Not all aspects of polycentric governance easily apply to either
atmospheric or Internet governance. Given that the climate impacts
all humans, just as cyberspace includes an online community of more
than two billion users, the concept of self-organization, for example, is
240
strained due to the sheer scale of collective action involved.
Additionally, there are important drawbacks of polycentric regulation
to be addressed, such as the fact that a highly fragmented system can
also "yield gridlock rather than innovation" due in part to an
insufficient hierarchy. 241 Since such systems must "meet standards of

237.
See Ostrom, supra note 232, at 221.
238.
See, e.g., Cole, McGinnis, & Epstein, supra note 227, at 8.
239.
Id. at 9.
240.
See Roger Hurwitz, The Prospects for Regulating Cyberspace: A Schematic Analysis
on the Basis of Elinor Ostrom, "General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social
Ecological Systems," 325 SC. 419, 419-22 (2009).
241.
Keohane & Victor, supra note 27, at 15.
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coherence, effectiveness, [and] . . . sustainability," an unclear
242
hierarchy may lead to inconsistency and systemic failures.
There are also political and ethical issues to consider. First,
polycentric regulation may result in what Garrett Hardin called
"lifeboat ethics," which holds that when it is impossible to equitably
preserve access to the commons for all, the poor are left behind. 243 In
the climate context, this is already arguably playing out because the
least-developed nations are those most vulnerable to-and least able
to adapt to-a rapidly changing climate. 244 In the cyber context, this
conflict could take the form of developing nations' inability to make
needed cybersecurity gains in the absence of a multilateral framework
without resource and technology transfers from developed nations.
Second, there is a school of thought that some nations may be less
inclined to cooperate in smaller forums because they are unable to
hide behind others. For example, the cyber powers have long been
reluctant to negotiate thorny verification and attribution issues,
among other concerns, in a minilateral (typically bilateral or regional)
forum given their current asymmetric advantages. 245 However, the
recent announcement of progress toward a cybersecurity code of
conduct between the United States and China calls such arguments
into question. 246 Similarly, this thinking may no longer apply in the
climate context given the array of bilateral and minilateral GHG
reduction announcements, including by the G2. 247 Still, the question
must still be addressed: even with a polycentric status quo taking hold
in both Internet and atmospheric governance, will it be enough to
address the challenges of climate change and cyber attacks?

242.
Id. at 3, 19-20.
243.
See Garrett Hardin, Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1974, at 38-40, 123-124, 126 (examining, from an ethical viewpoint,
when swimmers surrounding a lifeboat should be taken aboard as an analogy for analyzing
resource distribution policies given the divide between developed and developing nations).
244.
See, e.g., John Vidal, Climate Change Will Hit Poor Countries Hardest, Study
Shows, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2013, 04:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2013/sep/27/climate-change-poor-countries-ipcc [https://perma.ccF4Q3-UA9U].
245.
Cf. Jeremy Kirk, Russia Pushes for Online Code of Conduct at United Nations
General Assembly, COMPUT. WORLD UK (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/

it-management/russia-pushes -for-online-code-of--conduct-at- united-nations- general-assembly3307976/3, 2011), [https://perma.cc/7WL5-ZVAQ] (reporting on the push for an online code of
conduct).
246.
See, e.g.,
Felicia Schwartz, U.S., China Conclude Annual Talks Amid Tensions,
WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2015, 7:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-conclude-annualtalks-amid-tensions- 1435188788 [https://perma.cc/8CGV-EVJC].
247.
See Tollefson, supra note 112.
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E. Will it be Enough? A Look at Regime Effectiveness
An effective system of polycentric governance for both
cyberspace and the atmosphere would use a mixture of laws and
norms; market-based incentives; code; self-regulation; public-private
partnerships; and bilateral, regional, and multilateral collaboration to
enhance cybersecurity and fight climate change. Yet even if such a
system were practicable, polycentric networks are susceptible to the
array of issues including gridlock discussed above. 248 Thus, it is useful
to assess the desirability of such an approach by analyzing the current
state of affairs, especially as both these arenas move increasingly in
the direction of polycentric governance. However, measuring the
effectiveness of these regimes is problematic and is posed here merely
to couch the debate about how best to address global collective action
problems in greater context and to help illustrate the difficulties
involved with realizing the promise of polycentric governance in
promoting cyber peace and addressing climate change. 249
Regime effectiveness has become a "driving force . . . in the
analysis of international relations. 2 5 °
Empirical studies have
suggested that there is modest support for the proposition that
international agreements improve on the status quo of international
affairs. 251 However, the array of literature on regime effectiveness
that has arisen in fields such as human rights law has not been
applied to Internet governance partly because of the difficulty of
making causal inferences under a variety of conditions, given the lack
of robust data. 252 More relevant work has been done in the climate
context, but there it is rare to compare these global commons
regimes. 255 Moreover, it is a challenging proposition to measure the
effectiveness of regime complexes, because the governance structures

248.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 27, at 14, 17 (explaining that different
components within a partially fragmented regime complex may compete with each other,
resulting in a gridlock of innovation).
249.
A prior version of this research as applied to cyberspace was published in Cyber
Peace, in SHACKELFORD, supra note 31; Shackelford, supra note 132, at 123.
250.
Michael Zirn, The Rise of InternationalEnvironmental Politics:A Review of Current
Research, 50(4) WORLD POLITICS 617, 649 (1998).
251.
See Scott Barrett, Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements, 46
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 878, 892 (1994); Carsten Helm & Detlef Sprinz, Measuring the
Effectiveness of InternationalEnvironmentalRegimes, 44 J. CONFLICT RES. 630, 638-39 (2000).
252.
See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002) (declaring that a quantitative approach to tracing the effectiveness
of relationships within human rights law is typically difficult, if not impossible).
253.
See Oran R. Young, Effectiveness of InternationalEnvironmental Regimes: Existing
Knowledge, Cutting-Edge Themes, and Research Strategies, 108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. 19853, 19853 (2011).
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at work are diverse and not easily amenable to quantifiable
comparison. 254
At best, correlations may be highlighted.
A
comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of international climate
and cyber law is thus beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless,
some qualitative and quantitative analysis of the performance of these
regimes is possible by comparing the performance of those regimes to
an ideal type, as well as to a no-regime counterfactual. Professor
255
Oran Young's groundbreaking work in this area is used here,
particularly a legal-political approach to analyze some aspects of
international law underpinning both Internet and atmospheric
governance.
A comprehensive approach to comparing cyber and atmospheric
governance is daunting given both the amount of polycentric
regulations in play as well as the lack of binding international cyber
law below the armed attack threshold. 256 Diverse bodies of law and
custom are applicable in both arenas to help fill in the law of cyber
peace and of the atmosphere. However, some comparisons, although
unsophisticated, are possible across the global commons, a sampling of
which is summarized in Figure 4.

254.
See Zilrn, supra note 250, at 632 (suggesting that scholars "focus on observable
political effects of institutions rather than directly on environmental impact" because of the
difficulty of measuring the actual impacts resulting from a given regulatory action).
255.
Oran R. Young & Marc A. Levy, The Effectiveness of InternationalEnvironmental, in
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND

BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 1, 4-6 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999).
256.
The armed attack threshold is the line at which the law of war is activated. See An
Introduction to the Law of Cyber War and Peace, in SHACKELFORD, supra note 31.
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Figure 4. Selection of International Agreements Governing
25 7
the Global Commons.
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JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: ENVIRONMENTAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL

GOVERNANCE 157-59 (2000) (table adapted and updated data from International Maritime
Organization, the United Nations, International Whaling Commission, the Secretariat of the
Antarctic Treaty, and the London Convention and Protocol); e.g., U.N. Treaties and Principles on
Outer Space, U.N. Sales No. E.08.I. 10 (2008); Int'l Maritime Organization [IMO], MARPOL,
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (Nov. 2, 1973),
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-

[https://perma.cc/WD39-4QFR];
the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-%28MARPOL%29.aspx
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997,
2303

U.N.T.S. 162,

http://unfccc.intkyoto-protocol/items/2830.php

[https://perma.cc/E99D-

MUJ5] (naming the rules setting out the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol that were adopted
at COP7 in Marrakesh in 2001 the 'Marrakesh Accords"); see Membership and Contracting
Governments, INT'L WHALING COMM'N, http://iwc.int/members.htm [https://perma.cc/7BAFVSKH]; Parties, SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats-parties.
aspx?lang-e [https://perma.cc/6M6L-HJ97] (including both consultative and non-consultative
parties); cf. Cyber Peace, in SHACKELFORD, supra note 31.
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The data summarized in Figure 4 allude to at least five
important trends in global commons governance, only some of which
are applicable to Internet and atmospheric governance, demonstrating
how these new commons regimes are departing in some ways from
historical counterpoints such as space law. 258 First, reservations may
be found in 44 percent of the surveyed accords included in Figure 4.
For example, the Budapest Convention permits states to opt out of
specific provisions, thus potentially weakening the regime even as it
259
functions to expand membership and speeds entry into force.
However, reservations are not allowed in any of the "big three" climate
agreements surveyed-the Montreal Protocol, the UNFCCC itself, or
the Kyoto Protocol, highlighting the relative strength of this regime.
Second, the time span between negotiation to entry into force of
climate accords is lengthening, as may be seen in Figure 4. This trend
correlates with the rise in multipolar politics that make consensus
more difficult to reach. This shift is consistent with the space law
regime as well. Insufficient data exists to compare these findings with
the Internet governance context given that the only dedicated
international cybersecurity treaty is the Budapest Convention itself,

258.
There are more than 124 multilateral agreements regulating areas of the global
commons ranging in scope and purpose that were included in these estimates drawn from the
work of Professor John Vogler and updated using publicly available information from the listed
sources in Figure 3.For more information, see VOGLER, supra note 256, at 152-81.

259.
Convention on Cybercrime, arts. 42-43, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm
[https://perma.ccAQ94-KXBB]; see
VOGLER, supra note 257, at 159.
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which only came online in 2001.260
26 1
analyze various ITU documents.
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However, future work could

Figure 5. Number of Months for Selected Climate
Treaties to Enter into Force.
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Third, the number of ratifying states has remained fairly
constant in the climate regime with more than 190 nations ratifying
the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, as well as the UNFCCC as shown
in Figure 4. This trend makes atmospheric governance stand out in
some ways given the extent to which the number of ratifications has
fallen off in other arenas such as outer space. 26 2 Again, insufficient
data exists to paint a picture in the Internet governance context,
though the number of ratifications to the Budapest Convention has
26 3
been steadily growing.
Fourth, enforcement provisions are often lacking in these
agreements, 26 4 as are information sharing and verification
mechanisms as was discussed in Parts III and IV. 26 5 Fifth, when
reviewing the entirety of global commons regulations as Professor
John Vogler has attempted, more than half of the total agreements are
260.

Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 259.

261.

See, e.g., ITU, UNDERSTANDING CYBERCRIME: PHENOMENA, CHALLENGES AND LEGAL

OPTIONS 11, 127-28 (2012), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/Cybercrime /20
legislation%20EV6.pdf [https://perma.cc/68NZ-7KCN] (listing other relevant model laws,
including the Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer-related Crime).
262.
See Shackelford, Governing the FinalFrontier,supra note 28 at 429-30.
263.
See Eur. Consult. Ass., Convention on Cybercrime, ETS No. 185 (Nov. 23,
2001), http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=28/
06/2013&CL=ENG [https://perma.cc/S539-A82J].
264.

VOGLER, supra note 257, at 172.

265.
See id. at 167-69. Other trends are also prevalent in Table 7.2, especially regarding
the space law treaties. For example, while the amount of time it has taken for space law treaties
to enter into force has gradually increased, there was a concurrent decrease in both the number
of ratifying and signatory states to the principal space law treaties from 1967 to 1984.
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regional or sub-regional in scope, 266 underscoring the move toward a
regime complex. 26 7 Again, the climate and Internet regimes stand out
given that they are

global in scope, even as

some minilateral

agreements-such as the G2 Cybersecurity Code of Conduct
referenced above-seem to be catching on.
Overall, the fact that reservations are not allowed and the
number of ratifying states has remained high (even as these
agreements are global in scope) made the state of atmospheric
governance appear relatively healthy heading into Paris, as compared
to other global commons regimes such as space law. Indeed, the Paris

Agreement

continued this trend in that it similarly disallows

reservations. 26 8 However, accords, even when they are agreed to, are
taking longer to enter into force across these arenas while thorny
issues of attribution, verification, and enforcement remain daunting.
The effectiveness of these regimes has been varied as a result of these
269
and other factors.
Focusing on cyberspace, an argument could be made that some
elements of Internet governance are working rather well relative to

other parts of the global commons. The growing membership of the
Budapest Convention, the relative rarity of cyber terrorism incidents,
the absence of genuine cyber war, the increasing rates of e-commerce,

and the TCP/IP's successful scaling all go to support this view.
However, the growth of cybercrime and espionage has lead to not only
more than $400 billion in annual losses, 270 but also the apparent
proliferation of sophisticated cyber weapons and state-sponsored
attacks.
These developments call Professor Ostrom's contention
271
regarding the relative success of Internet governance into question.

266.
VOGLER, supra note 257, at 156 (noting that participation of states in various
regimes is a key issue in mitigating global governance challenges).
267.
See id., at 179.
268.
See Adoption of the Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015fL.9/Rev.1 (2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2015/cop2l/eng/109r01.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2NL-GBUV].
269.
Id. at 18, 161, 170-71 (providing that effectiveness in some of the more recently
established regimes proves difficult to ascertain beyond a level of informed speculation).
270.
See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, supra note 1; see also BAE SYS. APPLIED
INTELLIGENCE, THE COST OF CYBERCRIME 2-3 (2011), http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/
resources/cost-of-cybercrime/full-report.pdf
[https:H/perma.cc/GG8Q-LZ9P]
(estimating that
cybercrime costs the British economy approximately $43 billion annually).
271.
To take one other example of the continued difficulty of enhancing cybersecurity,
consider the case of online voting. This is becoming more popular in parts of the world, but a
pilot program in Washington, D.C., in late 2012, resulted in security specialists finding a number
of lapses-a team from the University of Michigan was even able to hack the website so that the
University's fight song would play after a vote was cast. See Timothy B. Lee, The Michigan Fight
Song and Four Other Reasons to Avoid Internet Voting, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 24, 2012),

2016]

ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CYBER ATTACKS

Considering atmospheric governance, there is also some
evidence that the current polycentric approach is working to help
mitigate the problem of global climate change.
National and
minilateral undertakings, such as the Paris Agreement, China's
pledge to reach peak emissions before 2030,272 and the continuing
decline in US emissions, help support this view. 273 However, the slew
of data from the IPCC and other organizations alluding to the
unsustainable status quo in GHG emissions and associated effects
should elicit the question whether this approach will, in fact, be
274
sufficient.
While current laws and policies are not ideal for fostering an
effective regime to manage climate change-and, for that matter, a
positive cyber peace-it does seem evident that these legal systems
are preferable to a no-regime counterfactual. That is, it is clear that
current laws are preferable to none at all, given the anarchy possible
in the absence of any regulation. Although ambiguities and gaps
persist, the advancement made to enhance cybersecurity would likely
27
not have been possible without these and other legal systems.
Further, the types of polycentric interaction occurring in both Internet
and atmospheric governance may help speed progress towards the
desired ends. Professor Hugh Ward, for example, has argued, "[W]hen
nations participate in particular regimes, they also become part of a
wider network. This network links nations and also individual
regimes. It embodies social capital that may be used to encourage
nations to behave sustainably. ''276 As a result, such polycentric
http://arstechnica.comltech-policy/2012/10/the-michigan-fight-song-and-four-other-reasons-toavoid-internet-voting! [https://perma.cc/AT2A-DMYT].
272.
See Press Release, White House, supra note 113.
273.
Cf. Brad Plumer, After Years of Decline, U.S. Carbon Emissions Rose 2 Percent in
2013, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.comblogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/
13/after-years -of-decline-u-s-carbon-emissions-rose- 2 -percent-in-2013/
[https://perma.cc/ZJV7PKRW].

274.
See, e.g., Steve Almsay, Invest Now or Face 'Irreversible'Effects of Climate Change,
U.N. Panel Warns, CNN (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/02/world/ipcc-climatechange-report/ [https://perma.cc/3MLD-FTKF].
275.

See, e.g., VOGLER, supra note 257, at 180-81; Europeans Charged in US Over

Destructive Computer Virus, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-uscanada-21174685 [https://perma.cc/47D9-NX4U]
(reporting that Russian, Latvian, and
Romanian defendants are in the process of being extradited to the United States to stand trial
for launching a virus named Gozi that was responsible for the theft of millions of dollars)
[hereinafter Europeans Charged].
276.
Hugh Ward, International Linkages and Environmental Sustainability: The
Effectiveness of the Regime Network, 43 J. PEACE RES. 149, 150 (2006); see, e.g., Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 205, 231 (1993). Professor Slaughter has also pioneered network theory studying
transnational regulatory networks and its progeny. However, this work primarily focuses on
states, making it less useful for analyzing atmospheric and Internet governance. See Anne-Marie
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undertakings could help generate a synergistic effect: a virtuous cycle
whereby stakeholders involved in international regimes like climate
and cyber law enjoy deepening linkages allowing them to create, for
example, common codes of conduct. It is to this final topic and what
this all means for managers and policymakers alike that we turn to
next.
F. A Path Forward:Implications for Managers and Policymakers
Much is to be lauded in the field of polycentric governance
generally, and Professor Ostrom's work in particular. For example,
Professor Ostrom's work shows "an abiding appreciation of the
boundless creativity of individuals and the communities they inhabit.
• . [as well as] her drive to pay equal attention to scientific rigor and
policy relevance.' ' 277 Indeed, it is this drive for policy relevance that
makes polycentric governance such a potentially helpful, if complex,
tool for various stakeholders. And it is a tool that more actors,
including academics, are using whether they realize it or not. As
Professor Robert Stavins predicted:
[I]tappears that the 2015 agreement will reflect a hybrid climate policy
architecture-one that combines top-down elements, such as for monitoring, reporting,
and verification, with bottom-up elements, including 'Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions' (INDCs), describing what a country intends
to do to reduce emissions,
278
based on domestic political feasibility and other factors.

This is, in essence, describing a polycentric approach to Paris
and beyond, and one that was realized in the final 2015 Paris
Agreement. 279 What, though, are the lessons revealed in this study
that may be applied to increase the chances for success at COP21 and
to the cybersecurity arena?
For one thing, as shown in the analysis of the IAD Framework,
terminology should be clarified to help define whether the
atmosphere-and, for that matter, cyberspace-are indeed part of a
common heritage regime in one form or another, aiding in the
definition of group boundaries to incentivize sustainable use.
Likewise, defining common but differentiated responsibilities in both
contexts is vital to aid proportionality and help create a level playing
field. This process could take the form of delineating enhanced
Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 308
(2004).
277.
See e.g. McGinnis, supra note 228.
278.

A Challenge for the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, ROBERT STAVINS (Feb. 2, 2015),

http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2015/02/02/a-challenge -for-the- 2 015-paris-climate- agreement/
[https://perma.cc/4ZU7-BKT3].
279.
See Davenport, supra note 59.
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requirements for major emitters and the cyber powers to aid those
nations most at risk of climate change and becoming havens for
cybercriminals, even as it places requirements on those nations to
take the steps necessary to help themselves such as by drafting
domestic cybercrime legislation and creating cyber emergency
response teams.
Engaged and proactive rulemaking by technical communities,
the private sector, and the international community is also vital to the
Some
functioning of both atmospheric and Internet governance.
tentative steps are being made in this direction such as by the 2014
US National Institute for Standards and Technology Cybersecurity
Framework, which harmonizes consensus standards and industry best
practices to provide a flexible and cost-effective approach to enhancing
cybersecurity that assists owners and operators of critical
infrastructure in assessing and managing cyber risk. 280 Other nations
are considering a similar bottom-up approach to enhancing their own
national cybersecurity. 28 1 An array of communities and organizations
are similarly experimenting with regulatory and voluntary
frameworks to address the problem of climate change, from "Earth
Hour" to the now more than seven thousand organizations that have
submitted nearly thirty thousand sustainability reports using the
Global Reporting Initiative as of July 2015.282 The importance of
information-sharing organizations to the diffusion of threat
information and best practices is also vital to aid in verification and
enforcement in both the cyber and climate contexts. After all, aiding
collaboration through better communication is a vital component of
avoiding free riding and prisoner's dilemma situations, helping to
ward off a tragedy of the global commons. 28 3 Graduated sanctions,
280.
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
281.
See EU Eying NIST Framework With 'Great Interest,' INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (Feb.
5,
2014),
http://insidecybersecurity.com/index.php?option=com-user&view=login&return =
aHROcDovL21uc2lkZWN5YmVyc2VjdXJpdHkuY29tLON5YmVyLURhaWx5LU5ld3MvRGFpbHk
tTmV3cy9vZmZpY21hbClldSlleWluZyluaXNOLWZyYWlld29yay3aXRoLWdyZWFOLWludGVy
ZXNOL2 llbnUtaWQtMTA3NS5odG lsP3VObV9zb3VyY2U9ZGx2ci5pdCZidGlfbWVkaXVtPXR3a
XROZXI [https://perma.cc/CD83-PTC4].
282.
See
About
GRI,
GLOB.
REPORTING
INITIATIVE
[GRI],
https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/
LSB3-L5PL] (describing GRI's mission as promoting "[a] sustainable global economy where
organizations manage their economic, environmental, social and governance performance and
impacts responsibly, and report transparently"); EARTH HOUR, http://www.earthhour.org/
[https://perma.cc/5GJX-472W].
283.
See McGinnis, supra note 228, at 289. One illustration of free riding behavior is the
classic prisoner's dilemma game, in which there are gains from cooperation, but each player has
an incentive to free ride based on whatever the other player does. Aside from an interesting
theoretical exercise, the prisoner's dilemma is important because it can be modeled on any
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monitoring by peers (including competitors), 284 and effective dispute
resolution mechanisms that have been largely successful in the WTO
context should be encouraged in both arenas, especially since they
28 5
help to deter "second-order" collective action problems.
More generally, a push should be made, despite the challenges,
to follow the climate approach in the cyber context and encourage
transparency by nations announcing both pledges and best practices
that best fit their unique national circumstances as occurred in the
run up to COP21. The G2 Cybersecurity Code of Conduct is a helpful
step forward in this direction, but its secrecy detracts from its more
widespread applicability.
Overall, this form of polycentric undertaking is more similar to
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Framework
approach authored by Professor John Ruggie, which encourages
greater stakeholder buy-in from diverse organizations rather than a
multilateral, top-down approach to promoting human rights in
business practices. 28 6 Such an approach could also aid in norm
building by norm entrepreneurs, including leading businesses and
governments, announcing efforts that could eventually cause a "norm
cascade" in which cybersecurity and climate best practices become
internalized and eventually codified in national and international
laws. 28 7 Ultimately, the trick is finding the appropriate "balance
between simplicity and complexity" to better leverage the power of
28 8
polycentric governance to mitigate global collective action problems.

instance in which two (or more) players have an incentive to free ride, even though cooperation is
in their best interest. Such examples range from the arms race between the United States and
the former Soviet Union, to the climate change negotiations, and even the classic common
property problems of overusing pastures. See also MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
GAME THEORY 13, 15 (2002).
284.
McGinnis, supra note 228, at 293 ("[I]n empirical research, it often turns out that
those systems that involve local participants in monitoring and sanctioning are more likely to be
sustainable than those in which those functions are instead fulfilled by agents of the national
government.").
285.
Id. at 292 ("[T]o deter free riding, a group needs some mechanism of monitoring and
sanctioning, but since such activities are themselves costly, individual monitors or sanctions
have an incentive to shirk their responsibilities.").
286.
See, e.g., JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 78 (2013) ('The overriding lesson I drew... was that a new regulatory dynamic
was required under which public and private governance systems .. .each come to add distinct
value, compensate for one another's weaknesses, and play mutually reinforcing roles-out of
which a more comprehensive and effective global regime might evolve, including specific legal
measures. International relations scholars call this 'polycentric governance."').
287.
See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
PoliticalChange, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895-98 (1998).
288.
McGinnis, supra note 228, at 285.
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VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has traced the evolution of the climate change
regime focusing both on top-down UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and bottom-up bilateral and regional efforts. This
Article then compares and contrasts this history with Internet
governance through the lens of three variables: technological
advancement, resource scarcity, and multipolar politics.
Both
atmospheric and Internet governance may be considered to be
increasingly multi-stakeholder and polycentric-the Internet started
off that way, whereas climate policy began in the hands of relatively
few governments under the original Montreal Protocol and has since
diffused. There are distinct benefits to this arrangement in terms of
innovation, experimentation, and empowerment but also dangers in
the form of gridlock due to a lack of defined hierarchy. Both the global
collective action problems of climate change and cyber attacks deserve
sustained attention from all governance levels, from individuals on up
to the United Nations. Polycentricity helps scholars conceptualize
some of the dynamics of such a system, but ultimately a robust
IAD-SES Framework is required to help translate best practices for
both managers and policymakers; further research is needed to attain
this goal. Yet, there is also much people can do to make the global
local and, while not neglecting multilateral fora, help protect against
free riding while promoting the identification and dissemination of
community norms. Only by working together through polycentric
partnerships can we both promote cyber peace and mitigate the effects
of global climate change; that is an important legacy of Professor
Ostrom's work in this arena and a torch that we should all be willing
to raise.

